. . . "Dole\u017Eal, Adam" . "Kauzalita jako nutn\u00FD prost\u0159edek pro uchopen\u00ED pr\u00E1vn\u00ED odpov\u011Bdnosti?" . "153" . "5" . "Kauzalita jako nutn\u00FD prost\u0159edek pro uchopen\u00ED pr\u00E1vn\u00ED odpov\u011Bdnosti?" . "24095" . . . "Tento \u010Dl\u00E1nek se zab\u00FDv\u00E1 pojet\u00EDm kauzality v pr\u00E1vn\u00EDm diskursu. Z tohoto d\u016Fvodu se zab\u00FDv\u00E1 nejprve pojet\u00EDm kauzality v rovin\u011B v\u011Bdeck\u00E9, filosofick\u00E9 a v b\u011B\u017En\u011B u\u017E\u00EDvan\u00E9 \u0159e\u010Di.M\u00E1 smysl p\u0159i zkoum\u00E1n\u00ED pr\u00E1vn\u00ED kauzality vych\u00E1zet z n\u011Bkter\u00FDch teori\u00ED t\u00FDkaj\u00EDc\u00ED se kauzality obecn\u00E9? Nen\u00ED pr\u00E1vn\u00ED kauzalita jen um\u011Bl\u00FDm konstruktem, kter\u00FD v kone\u010Dn\u00E9m d\u016Fsledku za ur\u010Dit\u00FDch podm\u00EDnek uzn\u00E1v\u00E1 fikci p\u0159\u00ED\u010Dinn\u00E9ho vztahu, je\u017E je podkladem pro p\u0159izn\u00E1n\u00ED pr\u00E1vn\u00ED odpov\u011Bdnosti? N\u00E1zorov\u00E1 spektra se v tomto p\u0159\u00EDpad\u011B odli\u0161uj\u00ED, zat\u00EDmco n\u011Bkte\u0159\u00ED auto\u0159i tvrd\u00ED, \u017Ee v pr\u00E1vn\u00ED kauzalit\u011B se v podstat\u011B o kauzalitu v prav\u00E9m slova smyslu nejedn\u00E1 a jde tak pouze o pragmatick\u00E9 politick\u00E9 rozhodov\u00E1n\u00ED o uplatn\u011Bn\u00ED distributivn\u00ED a korektivn\u00ED spravedlnosti, \u010Di ekonomick\u00E9 zhodnocen\u00ED u\u017Eitku ve spole\u010Dnosti, jin\u00ED naopak poukazuj\u00ED na to, \u017Ee kauzalita jako takov\u00E1 m\u00E1 i v pr\u00E1vu sv\u00E9 od\u016Fvodn\u011Bn\u00ED v b\u011B\u017En\u00E9m pou\u017Eit\u00ED tohoto slova, tj. v \u201Ecommon sense\u201C smyslu nebo dokonce p\u0159\u00EDmo ve v\u011Bdeck\u00E9m smyslu. Jak\u00E1 krit\u00E9ria n\u00E1s tedy v pr\u00E1vn\u00EDm slova smyslu vedou k tomu, abychom mohli \u0159\u00EDci, \u017Ee z pr\u00E1vn\u00EDho hlediska jedn\u00E1n\u00ED nebo ud\u00E1lost jsou p\u0159\u00ED\u010Dinnou jin\u00E9 ud\u00E1losti zp\u016Fsobuj\u00EDc\u00ED \u00FAjmu? Kter\u00E9 ot\u00E1zky relevantn\u00ED pro filosofick\u00FD diskurs mohou b\u00FDt v pr\u00E1vn\u00EDm diskursu ignorov\u00E1ny jako nepodstatn\u00E9 tak, aby smysl cel\u00E9ho institutu nebyl naru\u0161en? Auto\u0159i se sna\u017E\u00ED pouk\u00E1zat na spojitost term\u00EDnu kauzalita v t\u011Bchto r\u016Fzn\u00FDch odv\u011Btv\u00EDch, by\u0165 se podle nich nutn\u011B dost\u00E1v\u00E1me do situace, kdy kauzalitu pova\u017Eujeme za pluralistick\u00FD pojem. V z\u00E1v\u011Bru se \u010Dl\u00E1nek pokou\u0161\u00ED na z\u00E1klad\u011B funkce deliktn\u00EDho pr\u00E1va nal\u00E9zt k jednotliv\u00FDm p\u0159\u00EDpad\u016Fm kauz\u00E1ln\u00ED souvislosti paradigmatick\u00E9 kauz\u00E1ln\u00ED p\u0159\u00EDpady, z nich\u017E by vych\u00E1zely ur\u010Dit\u00E9, v praxi vyu\u017Eiteln\u00E9 kauz\u00E1ln\u00ED vzorce." . "Kauzalita jako nutn\u00FD prost\u0159edek pro uchopen\u00ED pr\u00E1vn\u00ED odpov\u011Bdnosti?"@cs . "2"^^ . "Kauzalita jako nutn\u00FD prost\u0159edek pro uchopen\u00ED pr\u00E1vn\u00ED odpov\u011Bdnosti?"@cs . . "Causation as a Necessary Instrument for Understanding Legal Responsibility?"@en . "Tento \u010Dl\u00E1nek se zab\u00FDv\u00E1 pojet\u00EDm kauzality v pr\u00E1vn\u00EDm diskursu. Z tohoto d\u016Fvodu se zab\u00FDv\u00E1 nejprve pojet\u00EDm kauzality v rovin\u011B v\u011Bdeck\u00E9, filosofick\u00E9 a v b\u011B\u017En\u011B u\u017E\u00EDvan\u00E9 \u0159e\u010Di.M\u00E1 smysl p\u0159i zkoum\u00E1n\u00ED pr\u00E1vn\u00ED kauzality vych\u00E1zet z n\u011Bkter\u00FDch teori\u00ED t\u00FDkaj\u00EDc\u00ED se kauzality obecn\u00E9? Nen\u00ED pr\u00E1vn\u00ED kauzalita jen um\u011Bl\u00FDm konstruktem, kter\u00FD v kone\u010Dn\u00E9m d\u016Fsledku za ur\u010Dit\u00FDch podm\u00EDnek uzn\u00E1v\u00E1 fikci p\u0159\u00ED\u010Dinn\u00E9ho vztahu, je\u017E je podkladem pro p\u0159izn\u00E1n\u00ED pr\u00E1vn\u00ED odpov\u011Bdnosti? N\u00E1zorov\u00E1 spektra se v tomto p\u0159\u00EDpad\u011B odli\u0161uj\u00ED, zat\u00EDmco n\u011Bkte\u0159\u00ED auto\u0159i tvrd\u00ED, \u017Ee v pr\u00E1vn\u00ED kauzalit\u011B se v podstat\u011B o kauzalitu v prav\u00E9m slova smyslu nejedn\u00E1 a jde tak pouze o pragmatick\u00E9 politick\u00E9 rozhodov\u00E1n\u00ED o uplatn\u011Bn\u00ED distributivn\u00ED a korektivn\u00ED spravedlnosti, \u010Di ekonomick\u00E9 zhodnocen\u00ED u\u017Eitku ve spole\u010Dnosti, jin\u00ED naopak poukazuj\u00ED na to, \u017Ee kauzalita jako takov\u00E1 m\u00E1 i v pr\u00E1vu sv\u00E9 od\u016Fvodn\u011Bn\u00ED v b\u011B\u017En\u00E9m pou\u017Eit\u00ED tohoto slova, tj. v \u201Ecommon sense\u201C smyslu nebo dokonce p\u0159\u00EDmo ve v\u011Bdeck\u00E9m smyslu. Jak\u00E1 krit\u00E9ria n\u00E1s tedy v pr\u00E1vn\u00EDm slova smyslu vedou k tomu, abychom mohli \u0159\u00EDci, \u017Ee z pr\u00E1vn\u00EDho hlediska jedn\u00E1n\u00ED nebo ud\u00E1lost jsou p\u0159\u00ED\u010Dinnou jin\u00E9 ud\u00E1losti zp\u016Fsobuj\u00EDc\u00ED \u00FAjmu? Kter\u00E9 ot\u00E1zky relevantn\u00ED pro filosofick\u00FD diskurs mohou b\u00FDt v pr\u00E1vn\u00EDm diskursu ignorov\u00E1ny jako nepodstatn\u00E9 tak, aby smysl cel\u00E9ho institutu nebyl naru\u0161en? Auto\u0159i se sna\u017E\u00ED pouk\u00E1zat na spojitost term\u00EDnu kauzalita v t\u011Bchto r\u016Fzn\u00FDch odv\u011Btv\u00EDch, by\u0165 se podle nich nutn\u011B dost\u00E1v\u00E1me do situace, kdy kauzalitu pova\u017Eujeme za pluralistick\u00FD pojem. V z\u00E1v\u011Bru se \u010Dl\u00E1nek pokou\u0161\u00ED na z\u00E1klad\u011B funkce deliktn\u00EDho pr\u00E1va nal\u00E9zt k jednotliv\u00FDm p\u0159\u00EDpad\u016Fm kauz\u00E1ln\u00ED souvislosti paradigmatick\u00E9 kauz\u00E1ln\u00ED p\u0159\u00EDpady, z nich\u017E by vych\u00E1zely ur\u010Dit\u00E9, v praxi vyu\u017Eiteln\u00E9 kauz\u00E1ln\u00ED vzorce."@cs . "Pr\u00E1vn\u00EDk" . . . "2"^^ . . "Dole\u017Eal, Tom\u00E1\u0161" . "RIV/68378122:_____/14:00428166" . "0231-6625" . . . . "RIV/68378122:_____/14:00428166!RIV15-GA0-68378122" . . "I, P(GAP408/12/2574)" . "causality; tort law; legal liability"@en . "This article deals with the conception of causality in legal discourse.Authors firstly examine causation in the scientific, philosophical and common-sense discourse. Does it make sense to use general terms of the discourse of causality when examining causality in law? Isn\u2019t legal causality a mere artificial construct, legal fiction?. Some authors claim that legal causation is not essentially a causation in the true sense of the word and is thus only a pragmatic political decision regarding the application of distributive and corrective justice, and economic evaluation of benefits in society, others point out that causality in law as such is equal to its common everyday use or even is true to its scientific meaning.What are the criteria in the legal sense that lead us to judge that certain events causes harm? Which issues are relevant to our philosophical discourse which may , in the legal discourse, be ignored as irrelevant? The authors show the necessary connection between the terms causality in different branches although they conclude that causality is a pluralistic concept. The issue of this article is to find out solutions for causal connection in particular paradigmatic cases and set up some causal formulas that could be used in legal practice."@en . "CZ - \u010Cesk\u00E1 republika" . "27"^^ . "[695C1BE4DC43]" . . "Causation as a Necessary Instrument for Understanding Legal Responsibility?"@en . . . .