"26"^^ . "92043" . . . . . . . "RIV/68378122:_____/13:00397288" . . "[4C193DB9B77E]" . "Normativity and Reason-Dependence; A Comment on the Nature of Reasons"@en . . "In his recent From Normativity to Responsibility Joseph Raz argues for three features of practical reasons: that they are facts; that they are facts that can motivate agents qua being reasons; and that they motivate agents in virtue of agents\u2019 capacity to reflect on them as reasons (which he labels Reason\u2019). The paper identifies a tension between two conceptions of normativity that seem to co-exist in Raz\u2019s account: on the first of them, reasons remain psychologically efficacious albeit too subjective; the other, takes reasons to be objective normative facts which exist independently of our practical reasoning (or Reason). I caution against a conflation between mind-dependence (psychologism) and Reasondependence and suggest that practical reasons can remain simultaneously objective and motivating if we understand them in a Reason-dependent fashion. In the course of the paper a number of related questions on the nature of reasons are discussed and clarified."@en . "1"^^ . "2" . "IT - Italsk\u00E1 republika" . "RIV/68378122:_____/13:00397288!RIV14-AV0-68378122" . "Pavlakos, George" . "1"^^ . . . "Politica & Societ\u00E0" . "Pavlakos, George" . "Normativity and Reason-Dependence; A Comment on the Nature of Reasons"@en . "3" . . "reasons; normativity; Joseph Raz"@en . "10.4476/74761" . . "In his recent From Normativity to Responsibility Joseph Raz argues for three features of practical reasons: that they are facts; that they are facts that can motivate agents qua being reasons; and that they motivate agents in virtue of agents\u2019 capacity to reflect on them as reasons (which he labels Reason\u2019). The paper identifies a tension between two conceptions of normativity that seem to co-exist in Raz\u2019s account: on the first of them, reasons remain psychologically efficacious albeit too subjective; the other, takes reasons to be objective normative facts which exist independently of our practical reasoning (or Reason). I caution against a conflation between mind-dependence (psychologism) and Reasondependence and suggest that practical reasons can remain simultaneously objective and motivating if we understand them in a Reason-dependent fashion. In the course of the paper a number of related questions on the nature of reasons are discussed and clarified." . "Normativity and Reason-Dependence; A Comment on the Nature of Reasons" . "2240-7901" . . "I" . "Normativity and Reason-Dependence; A Comment on the Nature of Reasons" . .