"1"^^ . . "Revenue and efficiency in multi-unit uniform-price auctions"@en . "B\u0159esk\u00FD, Michal" . "Revenue and efficiency in multi-unit uniform-price auctions"@en . "13"^^ . . "0899-8256" . . "102767" . . . . "US - Spojen\u00E9 st\u00E1ty americk\u00E9" . "Revenue and efficiency in multi-unit uniform-price auctions" . "RIV/67985998:_____/13:00395840" . "November" . . "This paper analyzes efficiency in a uniform-price multi-unit auction with a positive reservation price. I demonstrate that the reservation price is an important policy tool that may increase efficiency (or welfare) in multi-unit uniform-price auctions. I show that the higher the reservation price is,the higher is the seller\u2019s revenue and the higher is the efficiency of a final allocation of units that could be attained in a multi-unit uniform-price auction. The reservation price increases the bidder\u2019s equilibrium strategy in a specific way that is inherent to the uniform-price auction. Thus the reservation price effect on efficiency is in contrast to other auction formats; e.g., the reservation price decreases efficiency in the Vickrey auction and single-unit auctions with symmetric bidders. Therefore the main result can be added to the list of results from mechanism design and auction theory that fail to extend the single-unit/single-dimensional context to the multi-unit/multi-dimensional one." . . . . "10.1016/j.geb.2013.05.007" . . . . . "[F74205109409]" . "multi-unit auction; multiple-object auction; market efficiency"@en . "Revenue and efficiency in multi-unit uniform-price auctions" . . "I, P(GAP402/11/1531)" . "000338813500013" . "RIV/67985998:_____/13:00395840!RIV15-GA0-67985998" . "82" . "1"^^ . "Games and Economic Behavior" . . "This paper analyzes efficiency in a uniform-price multi-unit auction with a positive reservation price. I demonstrate that the reservation price is an important policy tool that may increase efficiency (or welfare) in multi-unit uniform-price auctions. I show that the higher the reservation price is,the higher is the seller\u2019s revenue and the higher is the efficiency of a final allocation of units that could be attained in a multi-unit uniform-price auction. The reservation price increases the bidder\u2019s equilibrium strategy in a specific way that is inherent to the uniform-price auction. Thus the reservation price effect on efficiency is in contrast to other auction formats; e.g., the reservation price decreases efficiency in the Vickrey auction and single-unit auctions with symmetric bidders. Therefore the main result can be added to the list of results from mechanism design and auction theory that fail to extend the single-unit/single-dimensional context to the multi-unit/multi-dimensional one."@en .