"13"^^ . "401404" . "NL - Nizozemsko" . "The unbundling regime for electricity utilities in the EU: a case of legislative and regulatory capture?"@en . "van Koten, Silvester" . . "RIV/67985998:_____/08:00312628" . "000260272900025" . . "The unbundling regime for electricity utilities in the EU: a case of legislative and regulatory capture?"@en . "Re\u017Eim rozd\u011Blen\u00E9ho vlastnictv\u00ED pro elektr\u00E1rensk\u00E9 spole\u010Dnosti v EU:p\u0159\u00EDpad legislativn\u00EDho a regula\u010Dn\u00EDho \u00FAlovku?"@cs . "[E8EB518295DF]" . . . . "Energy Economics" . "Re\u017Eim rozd\u011Blen\u00E9ho vlastnictv\u00ED pro elektr\u00E1rensk\u00E9 spole\u010Dnosti v EU:p\u0159\u00EDpad legislativn\u00EDho a regula\u010Dn\u00EDho \u00FAlovku?"@cs . . . . . "van Koten, Silvester" . "Theory and empirics suggest that by curbing competition, incumbent electricity companies (Vertically Integrated Utilities, VIUs), can increase their profitability through combined ownership of generation and transmission and/or distribution networks. Because curbing competition is believed to be welfare-reducing, EU law requires unbundling (separation) of the VIU networks. However, the EU allows its member states the choice between incomplete (legal) and complete (ownership) unbundling. There is evidence that VIUs have tried to influence this choice through means of persuasion which should be more readily available in countries with a more corrupted political culture. This paper shows that among the old EU member states, countries which are perceived as more corrupt are indeed more likely to apply weaker forms of unbundling. Somewhat surprisingly, we do not obtain a similar finding for the EU member states that acceded in 2004. We provide a conjecture for this observation."@en . . "6" . . . "Ortmann, A." . "Theory and empirics suggest that by curbing competition, incumbent electricity companies (Vertically Integrated Utilities, VIUs), can increase their profitability through combined ownership of generation and transmission and/or distribution networks. Because curbing competition is believed to be welfare-reducing, EU law requires unbundling (separation) of the VIU networks. However, the EU allows its member states the choice between incomplete (legal) and complete (ownership) unbundling. There is evidence that VIUs have tried to influence this choice through means of persuasion which should be more readily available in countries with a more corrupted political culture. This paper shows that among the old EU member states, countries which are perceived as more corrupt are indeed more likely to apply weaker forms of unbundling. Somewhat surprisingly, we do not obtain a similar finding for the EU member states that acceded in 2004. We provide a conjecture for this observation." . . . "The unbundling regime for electricity utilities in the EU: a case of legislative and regulatory capture?" . . "The unbundling regime for electricity utilities in the EU: a case of legislative and regulatory capture?" . "1"^^ . "30" . "0140-9883" . "2"^^ . . "Teoretick\u00E9 a empirick\u00E9 v\u00FDsledky nazna\u010Duj\u00ED, \u017Ee vertik\u00E1ln\u00ED integrace v\u00FDroby a distribuce elet\u0159iny zvy\u0161uje ziskovost existuj\u00EDc\u00EDch elektr\u00E1rensk\u00FDch spole\u010Dnost\u00ED. Tato integrace \u010Dasto omezuje konkurenci a Evropsk\u00E1 unie se ji sna\u017E\u00ED zamezit rozd\u011Blen\u00EDm v\u00FDroby a distribuce. Rozd\u011Blen\u00ED m\u016F\u017Ee b\u00FDt m\u00E9n\u011B striktn\u00ED (leg\u00E1ln\u00ED) \u010Di strikn\u011Bj\u0161\u00ED (rozd\u011Blen\u00ED vlastnictv\u00ED). Ukazuje se, \u017Ee v zem\u00EDch s vy\u0161\u0161\u00EDm v\u00FDskytem korupce je rozd\u011Blen\u00ED m\u00E9n\u011B p\u0159\u00EDsn\u00E9, co\u017E ale p\u0159ekvapiv\u011B neplat\u00ED pro nov\u00E9 \u010Dleny Evropsk\u00E9 Unie."@cs . . "P(LC542), Z(AV0Z70850503), Z(MSM0021620846)" . "RIV/67985998:_____/08:00312628!RIV09-AV0-67985998" . "corruption; electricity markets; vertical integration"@en .