. . . "Z\u00EDsk\u00E1v\u00E1n\u00ED renty velk\u00FDmi vlastn\u00EDky akci\u00ED: d\u016Fkaz s pou\u017Eit\u00EDm dividendov\u00E9 politiky v \u010Cesk\u00E9 republice"@cs . "P(GA402/06/1293), Z(AV0Z70850503)" . "CERGE-EI Working Paper Series" . "rent extraction; large shareholders; corporate governance"@en . . "Proveden\u00EDm pr\u016F\u0159ezov\u00E9 anal\u00FDzy dividendov\u00E9 politiky firem demonstrujeme, \u017Ee v prost\u0159ed\u00ED rozv\u00EDjej\u00EDc\u00ED se ekonomiky s nep\u0159\u00EDli\u0161 vysp\u011Bl\u00FDm mechanismem \u0159\u00EDzen\u00ED firem z\u00EDsk\u00E1vaj\u00ED dominantn\u00ED vlastn\u00EDci ekonomickou rentu a okr\u00E1daj\u00ED minoritn\u00ED vlastn\u00EDky. Porovn\u00E1n\u00EDm vypl\u00E1cen\u00FDch dividend podle jednotliv\u00FDch vlastnick\u00FDch struktur (koncentrace, domicil a typ vlastnictv\u00ED) kvantifikujeme tyto efekty a poukazujeme na to, \u017Ee jsou zna\u010Dn\u00E9. Dokumentujeme, \u017Ee c\u00EDlov\u00FD dividendov\u00FD v\u00FDplatn\u00ED pom\u011Br pro firmy s dominantn\u00EDm vlastn\u00EDkem je n\u00EDzk\u00FD a p\u0159\u00EDtomnost siln\u00E9ho minoritn\u00EDho vlastn\u00EDka zvy\u0161uje v\u00FDplatn\u00ED pom\u011Br a zamezuje nejv\u011Bt\u0161\u00EDmu vlastn\u00EDku v z\u00EDsk\u00E1v\u00E1n\u00ED ekonomick\u00E9 renty. Na rozd\u00EDl od ostatn\u00EDch studi\u00ED z rozvinut\u00FDch ekonomik n\u00E1m n\u00E1\u0161 unik\u00E1tn\u00ED soubor dat z \u010Cesk\u00E9 republiky za obdob\u00ED 1996 a\u017E 2003 umo\u017Enuje vy\u0159e\u0161it probl\u00E9m s endogenitou vlastnictv\u00ED."@cs . "1;45" . "Bena, Jan" . "Using cross-sectional analysis of corporate dividend policy we show that large shareholders extract rents from firms and expropriate minority shareholders in the weak corporate governance environment of an emerging economy. By comparing dividends paid across varying corporate ownership structures - concentration, type, and domicile of ownership - we quantify these effects and reveal that they are substantial. We find that the target payout ratio for firms with majority ownership is low but that the presence of a significant minority shareholder increases the target payout ratio and hence precludes a majority owner from extracting rent. In contrast to other studies from developed markets, our unique dataset from the Czech Republic for the period 1996-2003 permits us to take account of the endogeneity of ownership."@en . "497211" . "45"^^ . "1211-3298" . "Rent extraction by large shareholders: evidence using dividend policy in the Czech Republic"@en . "Z\u00EDsk\u00E1v\u00E1n\u00ED renty velk\u00FDmi vlastn\u00EDky akci\u00ED: d\u016Fkaz s pou\u017Eit\u00EDm dividendov\u00E9 politiky v \u010Cesk\u00E9 republice"@cs . "291" . "Rent extraction by large shareholders: evidence using dividend policy in the Czech Republic" . "[AD81E3C153E1]" . "Rent extraction by large shareholders: evidence using dividend policy in the Czech Republic" . "RIV/67985998:_____/06:00039382!RIV07-AV0-67985998" . . "2"^^ . . "Hanousek, Jan" . . "RIV/67985998:_____/06:00039382" . . "2"^^ . "-" . "Rent extraction by large shareholders: evidence using dividend policy in the Czech Republic"@en . . . "Using cross-sectional analysis of corporate dividend policy we show that large shareholders extract rents from firms and expropriate minority shareholders in the weak corporate governance environment of an emerging economy. By comparing dividends paid across varying corporate ownership structures - concentration, type, and domicile of ownership - we quantify these effects and reveal that they are substantial. We find that the target payout ratio for firms with majority ownership is low but that the presence of a significant minority shareholder increases the target payout ratio and hence precludes a majority owner from extracting rent. In contrast to other studies from developed markets, our unique dataset from the Czech Republic for the period 1996-2003 permits us to take account of the endogeneity of ownership." . . "CZ - \u010Cesk\u00E1 republika" . . . . . . . .