. "6"^^ . . . "1"^^ . "RIV/47813059:19520/13:#0002270" . "https://mme2013.vspj.cz/about-conference/conference-proceedings" . "Concept of spatial power indices with applications on real voting data from the Lower House of the Czech Parliament"@en . "Concept of spatial power indices with applications on real voting data from the Lower House of the Czech Parliament" . "Concept of spatial power indices with applications on real voting data from the Lower House of the Czech Parliament" . . . "1"^^ . . "I" . . "978-80-87035-76-4" . . "[6F760AC8C067]" . "College of Polytechnics Jihlava, Tolst\u00E9ho 16, Jihlava, Czech Republic" . . "RIV/47813059:19520/13:#0002270!RIV14-MSM-19520___" . . "19520" . "Decision-making process of parliamentary voting has long attracted attention of political scientists, as well as economists and mathematicians. In general, taking into account game-theoretical approach, any parliamentary voting can be described as a cooperative game with transferable utility function. Moreover, in real world, agents of the game - usually political parties - act not strictly as predicted in theory. As all real systems are full of an uncertainty, also parliamentary voting can be described up to some degree of freedom. The concept of Shapley value, first introduced by L.S.Shapley in 1953, was the first attempt to evaluate players of these game types. Since then, many adjustments to the basic theory were done in order to improve real data results. One of such a transformation, the Owen and Shapley spatial index, took into account both the effect of agenda and the distribution of power. Adjustments of the index were done by Barr, Pasarelli and Benatiand, Marzetti, who teste d the theory on the decision-making process in the European Union. To incorporate the coalition-forming influence, Bilal, Albuquerque and Hosli proposed to consider additional weights to possible coalitions into power indices. This article applies the concept of additional weights to calculate power in a real voting, namely the data from the Lower House of the Czech Parliament with the emphasis on the State Budget voting issues." . . "MIELCOV\u00C1, Elena" . "Shapley-Shubik power index; power distribution; Czech Parliament"@en . . "Concept of spatial power indices with applications on real voting data from the Lower House of the Czech Parliament"@en . . "College of Polytechnics Jihlava" . . "Decision-making process of parliamentary voting has long attracted attention of political scientists, as well as economists and mathematicians. In general, taking into account game-theoretical approach, any parliamentary voting can be described as a cooperative game with transferable utility function. Moreover, in real world, agents of the game - usually political parties - act not strictly as predicted in theory. As all real systems are full of an uncertainty, also parliamentary voting can be described up to some degree of freedom. The concept of Shapley value, first introduced by L.S.Shapley in 1953, was the first attempt to evaluate players of these game types. Since then, many adjustments to the basic theory were done in order to improve real data results. One of such a transformation, the Owen and Shapley spatial index, took into account both the effect of agenda and the distribution of power. Adjustments of the index were done by Barr, Pasarelli and Benatiand, Marzetti, who teste d the theory on the decision-making process in the European Union. To incorporate the coalition-forming influence, Bilal, Albuquerque and Hosli proposed to consider additional weights to possible coalitions into power indices. This article applies the concept of additional weights to calculate power in a real voting, namely the data from the Lower House of the Czech Parliament with the emphasis on the State Budget voting issues."@en . "66647" . "Jihlava" . . . "Proceedings of the 31st International Conference Mathematical Methods in Economics 2013" . "2013-09-11+02:00"^^ .