"Modelov\u00E1n\u00ED za\u0159\u00EDzen\u00ED odoln\u00FDch proti \u00FAtok\u016Fm"@cs . "Peringer, Petr" . . . "3"^^ . "Ostrava" . . "3"^^ . "RIV/00216305:26230/04:PU49093" . "Modelling of Tamper-Proof Devices" . "[B963FFC48EA6]" . "P(GA102/04/0871)" . . . . "Hrub\u00FD, Martin" . . "255-260" . "Proceedings of 38th International Conference MOSIS'04" . . . "6"^^ . "Ro\u017Enov pod Radho\u0161t\u011Bm" . . . . "tamper-proof hardware, cryptographic attacks, cryptography, heterogeneous modelling, HELEF"@en . . "Modelling of Tamper-Proof Devices" . "R\u00E1bov\u00E1, Zde\u0148ka" . "Modelling of Tamper-Proof Devices"@en . "Modelov\u00E1n\u00ED za\u0159\u00EDzen\u00ED odoln\u00FDch proti \u00FAtok\u016Fm"@cs . . "26230" . "This paper deals with modelling the certain security aspects of hardware implementations of cryptographic mechanisms. These implementations are called tamper-proof devices and they are typically smart cards or cryptographic coprocess. The design of most available tamper-proof devices does not deal with various forms of side effects of cryptographic algorithms execution. A side-channel is the term commonly used for places where such undesirable information appears. The volume and usefulness of informatioon we are able to extract depends on the form of the side-channel. However, number of scientific papers proves that it is possible to effectively analyse information from side-channels and use the results for compromise of tamper-proof devices." . "2004-04-19+02:00"^^ . "RIV/00216305:26230/04:PU49093!RIV/2005/GA0/262305/N" . . "Modelling of Tamper-Proof Devices"@en . . . . "80-85988-98-4" . . "\u010Cl\u00E1nek se zab\u00FDv\u00E1 modelov\u00E1n\u00EDm ur\u010Dit\u00FDch bezpe\u010Dnostn\u00EDch aspekt\u016F hardwarov\u00FDch implementac\u00ED kryptografick\u00FDch mechanism\u016F. Tyto implementace se naz\u00FDvaj\u00ED za\u0159\u00EDzen\u00ED odoln\u00E1 proti \u00FAtoku a jsou to typicky \u010Dipov\u00E9 karty nebo kryptografick\u00E9 koprocesory. N\u00E1vrh t\u011Bchto za\u0159\u00EDzen\u00ED obvykle neobsahuje protiopat\u0159en\u00ED proti tak zvan\u00FDm bo\u010Dn\u00EDm efekt\u016Fm, kter\u00E9 prov\u00E1z\u00ED \u010Dinnost t\u011Bchto za\u0159\u00EDzen\u00ED. Bo\u010Dn\u00ED efekty zp\u016Fsobuj\u00ED \u00FAnik citliv\u00E9 informace z kryptografick\u00E9ho za\u0159\u00EDzen\u00ED. Z\u00E1va\u017Enost tohoto \u00FAniku z\u00E1vis\u00ED na p\u016Fvodu bo\u010Dn\u00EDho efektu a na schopnossti \u00FAto\u010Dn\u00EDka unikaj\u00EDc\u00ED informaci analyzovat.
"@cs . . "Neuveden" . "This paper deals with modelling the certain security aspects of hardware implementations of cryptographic mechanisms. These implementations are called tamper-proof devices and they are typically smart cards or cryptographic coprocess. The design of most available tamper-proof devices does not deal with various forms of side effects of cryptographic algorithms execution. A side-channel is the term commonly used for places where such undesirable information appears. The volume and usefulness of informatioon we are able to extract depends on the form of the side-channel. However, number of scientific papers proves that it is possible to effectively analyse information from side-channels and use the results for compromise of tamper-proof devices."@en . "574053" .