"On the Origin of Yet another Channel" . "[A9B08B5F4B3F]" . "On the Origin of Yet another Channel"@en . . . . "On the Origin of Yet another Channel" . . . "Maty\u00E1\u0161, V\u00E1clav" . . . "P(GAP202/11/0422)" . "2"^^ . "14330" . "2"^^ . "Cryptanalysis of a cryptographic function like stream, block or hash function usually requires human cryptanalytical skills and labour. However, some automation is possible -- e.g., by randomness testing suites like NIST/Diehard that can be applied to test statistical properties of cryptographic function outputs. Yet such testing suites are limited only to predefined statistical functions. We propose more open approach based on combination of software circuits and evolutionary algorithms to search for unwanted statistical properties like next bit predictability or random data non-distinguishability. Design of a software circuit acting as a testing function is automatically evolved by a stochastic optimization algorithm and uses the potentially unknown ``other channel'' leaking information during cryptographic function evaluation. We tested this approach on candidate algorithms for SHA-3 and eStream competitions with comparable (but slightly worse) results as STS NIST and Diehard tests w.r.t." . . "93922" . "Cambridge, UK" . . "RIV/00216224:14330/13:00066603!RIV14-GA0-14330___" . "2013-01-01+01:00"^^ . "Cryptanalysis of a cryptographic function like stream, block or hash function usually requires human cryptanalytical skills and labour. However, some automation is possible -- e.g., by randomness testing suites like NIST/Diehard that can be applied to test statistical properties of cryptographic function outputs. Yet such testing suites are limited only to predefined statistical functions. We propose more open approach based on combination of software circuits and evolutionary algorithms to search for unwanted statistical properties like next bit predictability or random data non-distinguishability. Design of a software circuit acting as a testing function is automatically evolved by a stochastic optimization algorithm and uses the potentially unknown ``other channel'' leaking information during cryptographic function evaluation. We tested this approach on candidate algorithms for SHA-3 and eStream competitions with comparable (but slightly worse) results as STS NIST and Diehard tests w.r.t."@en . . . "On the Origin of Yet another Channel"@en . "eStream; genetic programming; random distinguisher; randomness statistical testing; software circuit"@en . "9783642417160" . "0302-9743" . . "Springer-Verlag" . . . "\u0160venda, Petr" . "Berlin" . . "15"^^ . . . . "10.1007/978-3-642-41717-7_26" . . . "Proceedings of Security Protocols XXI" . "http://www.fi.muni.cz/~xsvenda/papers/spw2013/" . "RIV/00216224:14330/13:00066603" .