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Statements

Subject Item
n2:RIV%2F67985998%3A_____%2F13%3A00395840%21RIV15-GA0-67985998
rdf:type
n12:Vysledek skos:Concept
dcterms:description
This paper analyzes efficiency in a uniform-price multi-unit auction with a positive reservation price. I demonstrate that the reservation price is an important policy tool that may increase efficiency (or welfare) in multi-unit uniform-price auctions. I show that the higher the reservation price is,the higher is the seller’s revenue and the higher is the efficiency of a final allocation of units that could be attained in a multi-unit uniform-price auction. The reservation price increases the bidder’s equilibrium strategy in a specific way that is inherent to the uniform-price auction. Thus the reservation price effect on efficiency is in contrast to other auction formats; e.g., the reservation price decreases efficiency in the Vickrey auction and single-unit auctions with symmetric bidders. Therefore the main result can be added to the list of results from mechanism design and auction theory that fail to extend the single-unit/single-dimensional context to the multi-unit/multi-dimensional one. This paper analyzes efficiency in a uniform-price multi-unit auction with a positive reservation price. I demonstrate that the reservation price is an important policy tool that may increase efficiency (or welfare) in multi-unit uniform-price auctions. I show that the higher the reservation price is,the higher is the seller’s revenue and the higher is the efficiency of a final allocation of units that could be attained in a multi-unit uniform-price auction. The reservation price increases the bidder’s equilibrium strategy in a specific way that is inherent to the uniform-price auction. Thus the reservation price effect on efficiency is in contrast to other auction formats; e.g., the reservation price decreases efficiency in the Vickrey auction and single-unit auctions with symmetric bidders. Therefore the main result can be added to the list of results from mechanism design and auction theory that fail to extend the single-unit/single-dimensional context to the multi-unit/multi-dimensional one.
dcterms:title
Revenue and efficiency in multi-unit uniform-price auctions Revenue and efficiency in multi-unit uniform-price auctions
skos:prefLabel
Revenue and efficiency in multi-unit uniform-price auctions Revenue and efficiency in multi-unit uniform-price auctions
skos:notation
RIV/67985998:_____/13:00395840!RIV15-GA0-67985998
n3:aktivita
n11:P n11:I
n3:aktivity
I, P(GAP402/11/1531)
n3:cisloPeriodika
November
n3:dodaniDat
n8:2015
n3:domaciTvurceVysledku
n9:4315685
n3:druhVysledku
n4:J
n3:duvernostUdaju
n18:S
n3:entitaPredkladatele
n10:predkladatel
n3:idSjednocenehoVysledku
102767
n3:idVysledku
RIV/67985998:_____/13:00395840
n3:jazykVysledku
n14:eng
n3:klicovaSlova
multi-unit auction; multiple-object auction; market efficiency
n3:klicoveSlovo
n17:market%20efficiency n17:multi-unit%20auction n17:multiple-object%20auction
n3:kodStatuVydavatele
US - Spojené státy americké
n3:kontrolniKodProRIV
[F74205109409]
n3:nazevZdroje
Games and Economic Behavior
n3:obor
n16:AH
n3:pocetDomacichTvurcuVysledku
1
n3:pocetTvurcuVysledku
1
n3:projekt
n13:GAP402%2F11%2F1531
n3:rokUplatneniVysledku
n8:2013
n3:svazekPeriodika
82
n3:tvurceVysledku
Břeský, Michal
n3:wos
000338813500013
s:issn
0899-8256
s:numberOfPages
13
n15:doi
10.1016/j.geb.2013.05.007