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Statements

Subject Item
n2:RIV%2F67985998%3A_____%2F08%3A00343725%21RIV11-AV0-67985998
rdf:type
skos:Concept n12:Vysledek
dcterms:description
Players repeatedly face a coordination problem in a dynamic global game. By choosing a risky action (invest) instead of waiting, players risk instantaneous losses as well as a loss of payoffs from future stages, in which they cannot participate if they go bankrupt. Thus, the total strategic risk associated with investment in a particular stage depends on the expected continuation payoff. High continuation payoff makes investment today more risky and therefore harder to coordinate on, which decreases today's payoff. Thus, expectation of successful coordination tomorrow undermines successful coordination today, which leads to fluctuations of equilibrium behavior even if the underlying economic fundamentals happen to be the same across the rounds. The dynamic game inherits the equilibrium uniqueness of the underlying static global game. Players repeatedly face a coordination problem in a dynamic global game. By choosing a risky action (invest) instead of waiting, players risk instantaneous losses as well as a loss of payoffs from future stages, in which they cannot participate if they go bankrupt. Thus, the total strategic risk associated with investment in a particular stage depends on the expected continuation payoff. High continuation payoff makes investment today more risky and therefore harder to coordinate on, which decreases today's payoff. Thus, expectation of successful coordination tomorrow undermines successful coordination today, which leads to fluctuations of equilibrium behavior even if the underlying economic fundamentals happen to be the same across the rounds. The dynamic game inherits the equilibrium uniqueness of the underlying static global game.
dcterms:title
Coordination cycles Coordination cycles
skos:prefLabel
Coordination cycles Coordination cycles
skos:notation
RIV/67985998:_____/08:00343725!RIV11-AV0-67985998
n3:aktivita
n16:Z
n3:aktivity
Z(AV0Z70850503)
n3:cisloPeriodika
1
n3:dodaniDat
n4:2011
n3:domaciTvurceVysledku
n14:6092314
n3:druhVysledku
n10:J
n3:duvernostUdaju
n13:S
n3:entitaPredkladatele
n17:predkladatel
n3:idSjednocenehoVysledku
361331
n3:idVysledku
RIV/67985998:_____/08:00343725
n3:jazykVysledku
n15:eng
n3:klicovaSlova
global games; coordination; crises; cycles and fluctuations
n3:klicoveSlovo
n11:global%20games n11:cycles%20and%20fluctuations n11:coordination n11:crises
n3:kodStatuVydavatele
US - Spojené státy americké
n3:kontrolniKodProRIV
[D183DB3FA03B]
n3:nazevZdroje
Games and Economic Behavior
n3:obor
n7:AH
n3:pocetDomacichTvurcuVysledku
1
n3:pocetTvurcuVysledku
1
n3:rokUplatneniVysledku
n4:2008
n3:svazekPeriodika
63
n3:tvurceVysledku
Steiner, Jakub
n3:wos
000256284000016
n3:zamer
n8:AV0Z70850503
s:issn
0899-8256
s:numberOfPages
20