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Statements

Subject Item
n2:RIV%2F67985998%3A_____%2F08%3A00312628%21RIV09-AV0-67985998
rdf:type
n11:Vysledek skos:Concept
dcterms:description
Theory and empirics suggest that by curbing competition, incumbent electricity companies (Vertically Integrated Utilities, VIUs), can increase their profitability through combined ownership of generation and transmission and/or distribution networks. Because curbing competition is believed to be welfare-reducing, EU law requires unbundling (separation) of the VIU networks. However, the EU allows its member states the choice between incomplete (legal) and complete (ownership) unbundling. There is evidence that VIUs have tried to influence this choice through means of persuasion which should be more readily available in countries with a more corrupted political culture. This paper shows that among the old EU member states, countries which are perceived as more corrupt are indeed more likely to apply weaker forms of unbundling. Somewhat surprisingly, we do not obtain a similar finding for the EU member states that acceded in 2004. We provide a conjecture for this observation. Theory and empirics suggest that by curbing competition, incumbent electricity companies (Vertically Integrated Utilities, VIUs), can increase their profitability through combined ownership of generation and transmission and/or distribution networks. Because curbing competition is believed to be welfare-reducing, EU law requires unbundling (separation) of the VIU networks. However, the EU allows its member states the choice between incomplete (legal) and complete (ownership) unbundling. There is evidence that VIUs have tried to influence this choice through means of persuasion which should be more readily available in countries with a more corrupted political culture. This paper shows that among the old EU member states, countries which are perceived as more corrupt are indeed more likely to apply weaker forms of unbundling. Somewhat surprisingly, we do not obtain a similar finding for the EU member states that acceded in 2004. We provide a conjecture for this observation. Teoretické a empirické výsledky naznačují, že vertikální integrace výroby a distribuce eletřiny zvyšuje ziskovost existujících elektrárenských společností. Tato integrace často omezuje konkurenci a Evropská unie se ji snaží zamezit rozdělením výroby a distribuce. Rozdělení může být méně striktní (legální) či striknější (rozdělení vlastnictví). Ukazuje se, že v zemích s vyšším výskytem korupce je rozdělení méně přísné, což ale překvapivě neplatí pro nové členy Evropské Unie.
dcterms:title
The unbundling regime for electricity utilities in the EU: a case of legislative and regulatory capture? Režim rozděleného vlastnictví pro elektrárenské společnosti v EU:případ legislativního a regulačního úlovku? The unbundling regime for electricity utilities in the EU: a case of legislative and regulatory capture?
skos:prefLabel
The unbundling regime for electricity utilities in the EU: a case of legislative and regulatory capture? Režim rozděleného vlastnictví pro elektrárenské společnosti v EU:případ legislativního a regulačního úlovku? The unbundling regime for electricity utilities in the EU: a case of legislative and regulatory capture?
skos:notation
RIV/67985998:_____/08:00312628!RIV09-AV0-67985998
n4:aktivita
n14:Z n14:P
n4:aktivity
P(LC542), Z(AV0Z70850503), Z(MSM0021620846)
n4:cisloPeriodika
6
n4:dodaniDat
n16:2009
n4:domaciTvurceVysledku
van Koten, Silvester
n4:druhVysledku
n15:J
n4:duvernostUdaju
n9:S
n4:entitaPredkladatele
n7:predkladatel
n4:idSjednocenehoVysledku
401404
n4:idVysledku
RIV/67985998:_____/08:00312628
n4:jazykVysledku
n17:eng
n4:klicovaSlova
corruption; electricity markets; vertical integration
n4:klicoveSlovo
n6:vertical%20integration n6:corruption n6:electricity%20markets
n4:kodStatuVydavatele
NL - Nizozemsko
n4:kontrolniKodProRIV
[E8EB518295DF]
n4:nazevZdroje
Energy Economics
n4:obor
n10:AH
n4:pocetDomacichTvurcuVysledku
1
n4:pocetTvurcuVysledku
2
n4:projekt
n13:LC542
n4:rokUplatneniVysledku
n16:2008
n4:svazekPeriodika
30
n4:tvurceVysledku
van Koten, Silvester Ortmann, A.
n4:wos
000260272900025
n4:zamer
n12:AV0Z70850503 n12:MSM0021620846
s:issn
0140-9883
s:numberOfPages
13