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Statements

Subject Item
n2:RIV%2F62156489%3A43110%2F13%3A00200905%21RIV14-MSM-43110___
rdf:type
skos:Concept n12:Vysledek
dcterms:description
Scholars making economic policy recommendations to resolve corruption problem use several approaches, the most dominant of which are the principal-agent and rent-seeking theories. In this paper, we argue that the principal-agent theory has problems to account for the environment in which the agents offering and accepting corruption operate, and explain the importance of agents for survival of their environment. The rent-seeking theory, on the other hand, finds it difficult to establish socially effective legislation and ways to determine the barriers to entry that motivate agents to behave corruptly. Both problems, however, are vital for solving the problem of corruption. Lacking the knowledge of the agent's environment (system) and their significance for survival of the system, the theory cannot define incentives that would discourage the agent from acting in a corrupted way. If the rent-seeking theory does not determine the barriers to entry that motivate agents to behave corruptly, it cannot determine the proper legislation that would deter corrupt behaviour and lead to economic development. For these reasons we investigate if both problems can be explained and solved within the alternative theory of redistribution systems and its part -- the theory of parallel redistribution games. Scholars making economic policy recommendations to resolve corruption problem use several approaches, the most dominant of which are the principal-agent and rent-seeking theories. In this paper, we argue that the principal-agent theory has problems to account for the environment in which the agents offering and accepting corruption operate, and explain the importance of agents for survival of their environment. The rent-seeking theory, on the other hand, finds it difficult to establish socially effective legislation and ways to determine the barriers to entry that motivate agents to behave corruptly. Both problems, however, are vital for solving the problem of corruption. Lacking the knowledge of the agent's environment (system) and their significance for survival of the system, the theory cannot define incentives that would discourage the agent from acting in a corrupted way. If the rent-seeking theory does not determine the barriers to entry that motivate agents to behave corruptly, it cannot determine the proper legislation that would deter corrupt behaviour and lead to economic development. For these reasons we investigate if both problems can be explained and solved within the alternative theory of redistribution systems and its part -- the theory of parallel redistribution games.
dcterms:title
What is the Contribution of the Theory of Redistribution Systems to the Theory of Corruption? What is the Contribution of the Theory of Redistribution Systems to the Theory of Corruption?
skos:prefLabel
What is the Contribution of the Theory of Redistribution Systems to the Theory of Corruption? What is the Contribution of the Theory of Redistribution Systems to the Theory of Corruption?
skos:notation
RIV/62156489:43110/13:00200905!RIV14-MSM-43110___
n12:predkladatel
n13:orjk%3A43110
n3:aktivita
n18:Z
n3:aktivity
Z(MSM6215648904)
n3:cisloPeriodika
2
n3:dodaniDat
n14:2014
n3:domaciTvurceVysledku
n5:3029271 n5:5043379
n3:druhVysledku
n6:J
n3:duvernostUdaju
n19:S
n3:entitaPredkladatele
n16:predkladatel
n3:idSjednocenehoVysledku
117291
n3:idVysledku
RIV/62156489:43110/13:00200905
n3:jazykVysledku
n10:eng
n3:klicovaSlova
Corruption, redistribution system, parallel redistribution game, game theory
n3:klicoveSlovo
n9:redistribution%20system n9:parallel%20redistribution%20game n9:Corruption n9:game%20theory
n3:kodStatuVydavatele
CZ - Česká republika
n3:kontrolniKodProRIV
[A69C91A56925]
n3:nazevZdroje
Národohospodářský obzor
n3:obor
n15:AH
n3:pocetDomacichTvurcuVysledku
2
n3:pocetTvurcuVysledku
3
n3:rokUplatneniVysledku
n14:2013
n3:svazekPeriodika
13
n3:tvurceVysledku
Palát, Milan Wawrosz, Petr Otáhal, Tomáš
n3:zamer
n17:MSM6215648904
s:issn
1213-2446
s:numberOfPages
16
n11:organizacniJednotka
43110