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Statements

Subject Item
n2:RIV%2F62156489%3A43110%2F12%3A00188806%21RIV13-MSM-43110___
rdf:type
n6:Vysledek skos:Concept
dcterms:description
Scholars making economic policy recommendations to resolve corruption problem use several approaches, the most dominant of which are the principal-agent and rent-seeking theories. In this paper, we argue that the principal-agent theory has problems accounting for the environment in which the agents offering and accepting corruption operate, as well as explaining the importance of the agents for the survival of their environment. The rent-seeking theory, on the other hand, finds it difficult to establish socially effective legislation and ways to determine the barriers to entry that motivate agents to behave corruptly. Both problems, however, are vital for solving the problem of corruption. Lacking the knowledge of the agent's environment (system) and their significance for the survival of the system, the theory cannot define incentives that would discourage the agent from acting in a corrupted way. If the rent-seeking theory does not determine the barriers to entry that motivate agents to behave corruptly, it cannot determine the proper legislation that would deter corrupt behavior and lead to economic development. For these reasons we investigate if both problems can be explained and solved within the alternative theory of redistribution systems and its part - the theory of parallel redistribution games. Scholars making economic policy recommendations to resolve corruption problem use several approaches, the most dominant of which are the principal-agent and rent-seeking theories. In this paper, we argue that the principal-agent theory has problems accounting for the environment in which the agents offering and accepting corruption operate, as well as explaining the importance of the agents for the survival of their environment. The rent-seeking theory, on the other hand, finds it difficult to establish socially effective legislation and ways to determine the barriers to entry that motivate agents to behave corruptly. Both problems, however, are vital for solving the problem of corruption. Lacking the knowledge of the agent's environment (system) and their significance for the survival of the system, the theory cannot define incentives that would discourage the agent from acting in a corrupted way. If the rent-seeking theory does not determine the barriers to entry that motivate agents to behave corruptly, it cannot determine the proper legislation that would deter corrupt behavior and lead to economic development. For these reasons we investigate if both problems can be explained and solved within the alternative theory of redistribution systems and its part - the theory of parallel redistribution games.
dcterms:title
What is the Contribution of the Theory of Redistribution Systems to the Theory of Corruption? What is the Contribution of the Theory of Redistribution Systems to the Theory of Corruption?
skos:prefLabel
What is the Contribution of the Theory of Redistribution Systems to the Theory of Corruption? What is the Contribution of the Theory of Redistribution Systems to the Theory of Corruption?
skos:notation
RIV/62156489:43110/12:00188806!RIV13-MSM-43110___
n6:predkladatel
n15:orjk%3A43110
n3:aktivita
n17:Z
n3:aktivity
Z(MSM6215648904)
n3:dodaniDat
n10:2013
n3:domaciTvurceVysledku
n13:5043379 n13:3029271
n3:druhVysledku
n4:O
n3:duvernostUdaju
n9:S
n3:entitaPredkladatele
n18:predkladatel
n3:idSjednocenehoVysledku
180877
n3:idVysledku
RIV/62156489:43110/12:00188806
n3:jazykVysledku
n5:eng
n3:klicovaSlova
parallel redistribution game, game theory; Corruption, redistribution system,
n3:klicoveSlovo
n7:redistribution%20system n7:game%20theory n7:Corruption n7:parallel%20redistribution%20game
n3:kontrolniKodProRIV
[FA1E66C16309]
n3:obor
n16:AH
n3:pocetDomacichTvurcuVysledku
2
n3:pocetTvurcuVysledku
3
n3:rokUplatneniVysledku
n10:2012
n3:tvurceVysledku
Palát, Milan Otáhal, Tomáš Wawrosz, Petr
n3:zamer
n12:MSM6215648904
n14:organizacniJednotka
43110