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Statements

Subject Item
n2:RIV%2F49777513%3A23520%2F11%3A43898961%21RIV12-MSM-23520___
rdf:type
n8:Vysledek skos:Concept
dcterms:description
This article attempts to assess to what extent the central bank or the government should respond to developments that can cause financial instability, such as housing or asset bubbles, overextended budgetary policies or excessive public and household debt. To analyse this question, we set up a simple reduced-form model in which monetary and fiscal policy interact, and imbalances (bubbles) can occur in the medium-run. Considering several scenarios with both benevolent and idiosyncratic policy-makers, the analysis shows that the answer depends on a number of characteristics of the economy, as well as on the monetary and fiscal policy preferences with respect to inflation and output stabilisation. We show that socially optimal financial instability prevention should be carried out by: (i) both monetary and fiscal policy (sharing region) under some circumstances; and (ii) fiscal policy only (specialisation region) under others. There is, however, a moral hazard problem: both policy-makers have an incentive to be insufficiently pro-active in safeguarding financial stability and shift the responsibility to the other policy. Specifically, under a range of circumstances, we obtain a situation in which neither policy mitigates instability threats (indifference region). These results can be related to the build-up of the current global financial crisis, and have strong implications for the optimal design of the delegation process. This article attempts to assess to what extent the central bank or the government should respond to developments that can cause financial instability, such as housing or asset bubbles, overextended budgetary policies or excessive public and household debt. To analyse this question, we set up a simple reduced-form model in which monetary and fiscal policy interact, and imbalances (bubbles) can occur in the medium-run. Considering several scenarios with both benevolent and idiosyncratic policy-makers, the analysis shows that the answer depends on a number of characteristics of the economy, as well as on the monetary and fiscal policy preferences with respect to inflation and output stabilisation. We show that socially optimal financial instability prevention should be carried out by: (i) both monetary and fiscal policy (sharing region) under some circumstances; and (ii) fiscal policy only (specialisation region) under others. There is, however, a moral hazard problem: both policy-makers have an incentive to be insufficiently pro-active in safeguarding financial stability and shift the responsibility to the other policy. Specifically, under a range of circumstances, we obtain a situation in which neither policy mitigates instability threats (indifference region). These results can be related to the build-up of the current global financial crisis, and have strong implications for the optimal design of the delegation process.
dcterms:title
Macroprudential Policies and Financial Stability Macroprudential Policies and Financial Stability
skos:prefLabel
Macroprudential Policies and Financial Stability Macroprudential Policies and Financial Stability
skos:notation
RIV/49777513:23520/11:43898961!RIV12-MSM-23520___
n8:predkladatel
n17:orjk%3A23520
n3:aktivita
n15:Z
n3:aktivity
Z(MSM4977751301)
n3:cisloPeriodika
277
n3:dodaniDat
n10:2012
n3:domaciTvurceVysledku
n16:2396505
n3:druhVysledku
n7:J
n3:duvernostUdaju
n13:S
n3:entitaPredkladatele
n11:predkladatel
n3:idSjednocenehoVysledku
210177
n3:idVysledku
RIV/49777513:23520/11:43898961
n3:jazykVysledku
n20:eng
n3:klicovaSlova
instability, debt, monetary policy, fiscal policy
n3:klicoveSlovo
n4:monetary%20policy n4:debt n4:instability n4:fiscal%20policy
n3:kodStatuVydavatele
AU - Australské společenství
n3:kontrolniKodProRIV
[211FB38BEBA1]
n3:nazevZdroje
The Economic Record
n3:obor
n19:AH
n3:pocetDomacichTvurcuVysledku
1
n3:pocetTvurcuVysledku
3
n3:rokUplatneniVysledku
n10:2011
n3:svazekPeriodika
87
n3:tvurceVysledku
Stehlík, Petr Libich, Jan Hallett, Andrew Hughes
n3:zamer
n18:MSM4977751301
s:issn
0013-0249
s:numberOfPages
17
n14:doi
10.1111/j.1475-4932.2010.00692.x
n12:organizacniJednotka
23520