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Statements

Subject Item
n2:RIV%2F00216224%3A14210%2F14%3A00075361%21RIV15-MSM-14210___
rdf:type
n13:Vysledek skos:Concept
dcterms:description
The task of the experiment reported here is to examine decision making in ultimatum games with symmetric and asymmetric information. In the asymmetric information condition, subjects (n = 134) were given an opportunity to deceive their playing partner. I found that participants indeed deceived their partners, specifically: While subjects were given on average 108.06 (probabilistic) CZK (Czech Koruna) to divide among themselves and their partner, in the asymmetric condition they reported to their partner that they were given 59.05 CZK only. Subsequently, they allocated only 30.19 CZK to their partner in the asymmetric information ultimatum game, whereas in the symmetric information game, where deception was not possible, they allocated 48.65 CZK. The larger the surplus to be divided, the more deception was present. Women deceived significantly more than men and allocated less money to their partner in the asymmetric information ultimatum game (the effect size of gender was small, though). The task of the experiment reported here is to examine decision making in ultimatum games with symmetric and asymmetric information. In the asymmetric information condition, subjects (n = 134) were given an opportunity to deceive their playing partner. I found that participants indeed deceived their partners, specifically: While subjects were given on average 108.06 (probabilistic) CZK (Czech Koruna) to divide among themselves and their partner, in the asymmetric condition they reported to their partner that they were given 59.05 CZK only. Subsequently, they allocated only 30.19 CZK to their partner in the asymmetric information ultimatum game, whereas in the symmetric information game, where deception was not possible, they allocated 48.65 CZK. The larger the surplus to be divided, the more deception was present. Women deceived significantly more than men and allocated less money to their partner in the asymmetric information ultimatum game (the effect size of gender was small, though).
dcterms:title
Ultimatum game with asymmetric information: A study of deception and fairness Ultimatum game with asymmetric information: A study of deception and fairness
skos:prefLabel
Ultimatum game with asymmetric information: A study of deception and fairness Ultimatum game with asymmetric information: A study of deception and fairness
skos:notation
RIV/00216224:14210/14:00075361!RIV15-MSM-14210___
n3:aktivita
n12:I
n3:aktivity
I
n3:cisloPeriodika
1
n3:dodaniDat
n4:2015
n3:domaciTvurceVysledku
n10:9784640
n3:druhVysledku
n17:J
n3:duvernostUdaju
n8:S
n3:entitaPredkladatele
n7:predkladatel
n3:idSjednocenehoVysledku
51776
n3:idVysledku
RIV/00216224:14210/14:00075361
n3:jazykVysledku
n16:eng
n3:klicovaSlova
ultimatum game; deception; fairness; asymmetric information; gender differences
n3:klicoveSlovo
n5:ultimatum%20game n5:gender%20differences n5:asymmetric%20information n5:fairness n5:deception
n3:kodStatuVydavatele
SK - Slovenská republika
n3:kontrolniKodProRIV
[6052DFF409B2]
n3:nazevZdroje
Studia psychologica : an international journal of research and theory in psychological sciences
n3:obor
n11:AN
n3:pocetDomacichTvurcuVysledku
1
n3:pocetTvurcuVysledku
1
n3:rokUplatneniVysledku
n4:2014
n3:svazekPeriodika
56
n3:tvurceVysledku
Veselý, Štěpán
n3:wos
000335289800005
s:issn
0039-3320
s:numberOfPages
14
n14:organizacniJednotka
14210