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Statements

Subject Item
n2:RIV%2F00216208%3A11640%2F14%3A00439146%21RIV15-MSM-11640___
rdf:type
n16:Vysledek skos:Concept
dcterms:description
We present a two-stage coordination game in which early choices of experts with special interests are observed by followers who move in the second stage. We show that the equilibrium outcome is biased towards the experts’ interests even though followers know the distribution of expert interests. Expert influence is fully decentralised in the sense that each individual expert has a negligible impact. The bias in favour of experts results from a social learning effect that is multiplied through a coordination motive. We apply our results to the onset of social movements and to the diffusion of products with network externalities. We present a two-stage coordination game in which early choices of experts with special interests are observed by followers who move in the second stage. We show that the equilibrium outcome is biased towards the experts’ interests even though followers know the distribution of expert interests. Expert influence is fully decentralised in the sense that each individual expert has a negligible impact. The bias in favour of experts results from a social learning effect that is multiplied through a coordination motive. We apply our results to the onset of social movements and to the diffusion of products with network externalities.
dcterms:title
Influential opinion leaders Influential opinion leaders
skos:prefLabel
Influential opinion leaders Influential opinion leaders
skos:notation
RIV/00216208:11640/14:00439146!RIV15-MSM-11640___
n3:aktivita
n19:P n19:I
n3:aktivity
I, P(GA13-34759S)
n3:cisloPeriodika
581
n3:dodaniDat
n6:2015
n3:domaciTvurceVysledku
n11:6092314
n3:druhVysledku
n18:J
n3:duvernostUdaju
n14:S
n3:entitaPredkladatele
n8:predkladatel
n3:idSjednocenehoVysledku
21734
n3:idVysledku
RIV/00216208:11640/14:00439146
n3:jazykVysledku
n4:eng
n3:klicovaSlova
two-stage coordination game; equilibrium outcome; expert influence
n3:klicoveSlovo
n13:equilibrium%20outcome n13:expert%20influence n13:two-stage%20coordination%20game
n3:kodStatuVydavatele
GB - Spojené království Velké Británie a Severního Irska
n3:kontrolniKodProRIV
[7394F239B999]
n3:nazevZdroje
Economic Journal
n3:obor
n15:AH
n3:pocetDomacichTvurcuVysledku
1
n3:pocetTvurcuVysledku
3
n3:projekt
n9:GA13-34759S
n3:rokUplatneniVysledku
n6:2014
n3:svazekPeriodika
124
n3:tvurceVysledku
Steiner, Jakub Loeper, A. Stewart, C.
n3:wos
000346068400001
s:issn
0013-0133
s:numberOfPages
21
n5:doi
10.1111/ecoj.12100
n17:organizacniJednotka
11640