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Statements

Subject Item
n2:RIV%2F00216208%3A11640%2F14%3A00399506%21RIV15-MSM-11640___
rdf:type
skos:Concept n11:Vysledek
dcterms:description
We examine the determinants of the dissent in central bank boards voting records about monetary policy rates in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Sweden, the UK and the US. In contrast to previous studies, we consider 25 different macroeconomic, financial, institutional, psychological or preference-related factors jointly and use Bayesian model averaging (BMA) to formally assess the attendant model uncertainty. We find that the rate of dissent is between 5% and 20% for the examined central banks. We examine the determinants of the dissent in central bank boards voting records about monetary policy rates in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Sweden, the UK and the US. In contrast to previous studies, we consider 25 different macroeconomic, financial, institutional, psychological or preference-related factors jointly and use Bayesian model averaging (BMA) to formally assess the attendant model uncertainty. We find that the rate of dissent is between 5% and 20% for the examined central banks.
dcterms:title
The dissent voting behaviour of central bankers: what do we really know? The dissent voting behaviour of central bankers: what do we really know?
skos:prefLabel
The dissent voting behaviour of central bankers: what do we really know? The dissent voting behaviour of central bankers: what do we really know?
skos:notation
RIV/00216208:11640/14:00399506!RIV15-MSM-11640___
n3:aktivita
n10:S n10:I
n3:aktivity
I, S
n3:cisloPeriodika
4
n3:dodaniDat
n9:2015
n3:domaciTvurceVysledku
n13:1304011
n3:druhVysledku
n7:J
n3:duvernostUdaju
n14:S
n3:entitaPredkladatele
n16:predkladatel
n3:idSjednocenehoVysledku
11778
n3:idVysledku
RIV/00216208:11640/14:00399506
n3:jazykVysledku
n17:eng
n3:klicovaSlova
monetary policy; voting record; dissent
n3:klicoveSlovo
n8:monetary%20policy n8:dissent n8:voting%20record
n3:kodStatuVydavatele
GB - Spojené království Velké Británie a Severního Irska
n3:kontrolniKodProRIV
[54B9D9155FEC]
n3:nazevZdroje
Applied Economics
n3:obor
n15:AH
n3:pocetDomacichTvurcuVysledku
1
n3:pocetTvurcuVysledku
4
n3:rokUplatneniVysledku
n9:2014
n3:svazekPeriodika
46
n3:tvurceVysledku
Šmídková, K. Zápal, Jan Rusnák, M. Horváth, R.
n3:wos
000326919400010
s:issn
0003-6846
s:numberOfPages
12
n18:doi
10.1080/00036846.2013.851775
n12:organizacniJednotka
11640