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Statements

Subject Item
n2:RIV%2F00216208%3A11640%2F07%3A00394408%21RIV14-MSM-11640___
rdf:type
n12:Vysledek skos:Concept
dcterms:description
We analyze innovation races in a moral hazard setting. We develop a model where two competing entrepreneurs work independently on the same project. The entrepreneurs do not possess any wealth of their own and their research is financed by a venture capitalist. The project, if successful, generates a prize, which is to be shared between the winning entrepreneur and the venture capitalist. The venture capitalist cannot observe the allocation of funds he provides, which creates a moral hazard problem. We compare a competitive setting with a benchmark case where the venture capitalist finances only one entrepreneur. We show that the venture capitalist can increase the efficiency of research (hence, his own expected profit from investments) and alleviate the moral hazard problem, if he finances both entrepreneurs. This conclusion is unambiguous, when the entrepreneurs are at the same stage of R&D. Moreover, it holds for a large range of parameters also when the entrepreneurs are at the different stages of R&D, so that one of them is the leader in the innovation race and the other is the follower. We analyze innovation races in a moral hazard setting. We develop a model where two competing entrepreneurs work independently on the same project. The entrepreneurs do not possess any wealth of their own and their research is financed by a venture capitalist. The project, if successful, generates a prize, which is to be shared between the winning entrepreneur and the venture capitalist. The venture capitalist cannot observe the allocation of funds he provides, which creates a moral hazard problem. We compare a competitive setting with a benchmark case where the venture capitalist finances only one entrepreneur. We show that the venture capitalist can increase the efficiency of research (hence, his own expected profit from investments) and alleviate the moral hazard problem, if he finances both entrepreneurs. This conclusion is unambiguous, when the entrepreneurs are at the same stage of R&D. Moreover, it holds for a large range of parameters also when the entrepreneurs are at the different stages of R&D, so that one of them is the leader in the innovation race and the other is the follower.
dcterms:title
Financing of competing projects with venture capital Financing of competing projects with venture capital
skos:prefLabel
Financing of competing projects with venture capital Financing of competing projects with venture capital
skos:notation
RIV/00216208:11640/07:00394408!RIV14-MSM-11640___
n3:aktivita
n7:Z n7:P
n3:aktivity
P(KJB708020501), Z(MSM0021620846)
n3:dodaniDat
n10:2014
n3:domaciTvurceVysledku
n11:9804218
n3:druhVysledku
n16:O
n3:duvernostUdaju
n4:S
n3:entitaPredkladatele
n14:predkladatel
n3:idSjednocenehoVysledku
421964
n3:idVysledku
RIV/00216208:11640/07:00394408
n3:jazykVysledku
n15:eng
n3:klicovaSlova
venture capital; moral hazard; optimal contract
n3:klicoveSlovo
n6:moral%20hazard n6:optimal%20contract n6:venture%20capital
n3:kontrolniKodProRIV
[BC04BE031612]
n3:obor
n13:AH
n3:pocetDomacichTvurcuVysledku
1
n3:pocetTvurcuVysledku
2
n3:projekt
n17:KJB708020501
n3:rokUplatneniVysledku
n10:2007
n3:tvurceVysledku
Goldfain, E. Kováč, Eugen
n3:zamer
n18:MSM0021620846
n9:organizacniJednotka
11640