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Statements

Subject Item
n2:RIV%2F00216208%3A11320%2F13%3A10189388%21RIV14-MSM-11320___
rdf:type
skos:Concept n15:Vysledek
dcterms:description
We are concerned with modeling situations in which rational individuals can conclude profitable agreements but they may disagree about which agreement to conclude. Since Nash's papers on bargaining and Raiffa's studies on arbitration in the beginning of 1950's, it has been customary to formulate this problem as a nonempty collection B of pairs (S, d) where each S from B is a nonempty subset of a finite-dimensional real linear space IRn and d is a point in S. The elements of S are usually interpreted as the utility tuples that the players can obtain by cooperating, and d as the outcome when the players do not cooperate. We deal with point-valued solutions; that is, we wish to find a mapping from B into IRn which satisfies some plausible conditions like; for example, individual rationality, Pareto optimality, anonymity. First we present major models (some old, some recent) and their solution concepts. Then we propose some directions for future research. In particular, we discuss some of the solution functions that are called sequential solutions or stepwise solutions. These solutions are constructed with the help of two functions defined on B: a step function that gradually changes the point d while S is kept unchanged, and a solution function that assigns to (S,d) the limit of the sequence of points constructed by the step function. We are concerned with modeling situations in which rational individuals can conclude profitable agreements but they may disagree about which agreement to conclude. Since Nash's papers on bargaining and Raiffa's studies on arbitration in the beginning of 1950's, it has been customary to formulate this problem as a nonempty collection B of pairs (S, d) where each S from B is a nonempty subset of a finite-dimensional real linear space IRn and d is a point in S. The elements of S are usually interpreted as the utility tuples that the players can obtain by cooperating, and d as the outcome when the players do not cooperate. We deal with point-valued solutions; that is, we wish to find a mapping from B into IRn which satisfies some plausible conditions like; for example, individual rationality, Pareto optimality, anonymity. First we present major models (some old, some recent) and their solution concepts. Then we propose some directions for future research. In particular, we discuss some of the solution functions that are called sequential solutions or stepwise solutions. These solutions are constructed with the help of two functions defined on B: a step function that gradually changes the point d while S is kept unchanged, and a solution function that assigns to (S,d) the limit of the sequence of points constructed by the step function.
dcterms:title
Old and new solutions for bargaining problems Old and new solutions for bargaining problems
skos:prefLabel
Old and new solutions for bargaining problems Old and new solutions for bargaining problems
skos:notation
RIV/00216208:11320/13:10189388!RIV14-MSM-11320___
n15:predkladatel
n16:orjk%3A11320
n3:aktivita
n19:I
n3:aktivity
I
n3:dodaniDat
n7:2014
n3:domaciTvurceVysledku
n9:8197350
n3:druhVysledku
n17:D
n3:duvernostUdaju
n21:S
n3:entitaPredkladatele
n4:predkladatel
n3:idSjednocenehoVysledku
93577
n3:idVysledku
RIV/00216208:11320/13:10189388
n3:jazykVysledku
n13:eng
n3:klicovaSlova
Raiffa's solution; ordinal solution; sequential solution; arbitration; Bargaining
n3:klicoveSlovo
n6:arbitration n6:Raiffa%27s%20solution n6:ordinal%20solution n6:sequential%20solution n6:Bargaining
n3:kontrolniKodProRIV
[39C10FC7C77D]
n3:mistoKonaniAkce
Valašské Meziříčí
n3:mistoVydani
Ostrava
n3:nazevZdroje
Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Strategic Management and its Support by Information Systems
n3:obor
n20:BB
n3:pocetDomacichTvurcuVysledku
1
n3:pocetTvurcuVysledku
1
n3:rokUplatneniVysledku
n7:2013
n3:tvurceVysledku
Vlach, Milan
n3:typAkce
n5:EUR
n3:wos
000324842000022
n3:zahajeniAkce
2013-08-29+02:00
s:numberOfPages
8
n8:hasPublisher
Vysoká škola báňská - Technická univerzita Ostrava
n18:isbn
978-80-248-3096-4
n12:organizacniJednotka
11320