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Statements

Subject Item
n2:RIV%2F00216208%3A11230%2F11%3A10100257%21RIV12-GA0-11230___
rdf:type
skos:Concept n15:Vysledek
dcterms:description
Credit contracting between a lender with market power and a small start-up entrepreneur may lead to the rejection of projects whose expected benefits are higher than their total costs when adverse selection is present. This inefficiency may be eliminated by government support in the form of credit guarantees or interest-rate subsidies. The principal agent model of this paper compares different forms of government support and concludes that credit guarantees and interest-rate subsidies have an unambiguous positive effect on social efficiency, since they enable the funding of socially efficient projects that would not be financed otherwise. Credit contracting between a lender with market power and a small start-up entrepreneur may lead to the rejection of projects whose expected benefits are higher than their total costs when adverse selection is present. This inefficiency may be eliminated by government support in the form of credit guarantees or interest-rate subsidies. The principal agent model of this paper compares different forms of government support and concludes that credit guarantees and interest-rate subsidies have an unambiguous positive effect on social efficiency, since they enable the funding of socially efficient projects that would not be financed otherwise.
dcterms:title
Inefficient credit rationing and public support of commercial credit provision Inefficient credit rationing and public support of commercial credit provision
skos:prefLabel
Inefficient credit rationing and public support of commercial credit provision Inefficient credit rationing and public support of commercial credit provision
skos:notation
RIV/00216208:11230/11:10100257!RIV12-GA0-11230___
n15:predkladatel
n16:orjk%3A11230
n3:aktivita
n14:P
n3:aktivity
P(GA402/09/0380), P(GAP402/11/0948), P(GAP403/10/1235)
n3:cisloPeriodika
2
n3:dodaniDat
n4:2012
n3:domaciTvurceVysledku
n19:3536157
n3:druhVysledku
n9:J
n3:duvernostUdaju
n5:S
n3:entitaPredkladatele
n13:predkladatel
n3:idSjednocenehoVysledku
204266
n3:idVysledku
RIV/00216208:11230/11:10100257
n3:jazykVysledku
n17:eng
n3:klicovaSlova
investment; markets; imperfect information; asymmetric information
n3:klicoveSlovo
n10:investment n10:asymmetric%20information n10:markets n10:imperfect%20information
n3:kodStatuVydavatele
DE - Spolková republika Německo
n3:kontrolniKodProRIV
[4ACDC0EC6C9C]
n3:nazevZdroje
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
n3:obor
n8:AH
n3:pocetDomacichTvurcuVysledku
1
n3:pocetTvurcuVysledku
1
n3:projekt
n7:GAP403%2F10%2F1235 n7:GA402%2F09%2F0380 n7:GAP402%2F11%2F0948
n3:rokUplatneniVysledku
n4:2011
n3:svazekPeriodika
167
n3:tvurceVysledku
Janda, Karel
n3:wos
000292618200012
s:issn
0932-4569
s:numberOfPages
21
n18:organizacniJednotka
11230