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Statements

Subject Item
n2:RIV%2F00216208%3A11220%2F14%3A10284333%21RIV15-MSM-11220___
rdf:type
n5:Vysledek skos:Concept
dcterms:description
The so called Fiscal Compact signed by 25 out of 27 EU member states requires the states to transpose the treaty's rules that limit the annual structural deficit and the general government debt %22through provisions of binding force and permanent character, preferably constitutional%22 (Art. 3, §2). While the goal is set, the means are up to respective states, and thus an extraordinary wave of constitutional engineering has been triggered. This paper deals with four countries in Central Europe which have already adopted fiscal stability rules into their law: Germany, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. It describes the rules adopted and demonstrates that despite some similarities, four wholly distinct models of regulation have been used in these countries. These models are further examined and compared, in particular with respect to their substance (numerical, or institutional fiscal rules), criteria used (state debt, overall public debt, state budget deficit, or structural deficit) and enforcement mechanisms created (automatic cut of expenses, vote of non-confidence in the government, veto power of an independent fiscal council, judicial review, etc.). Finally, the models are evaluated both from the perspective of their democratic legitimacy and from the perspective of their expected efficiency, where the paper draws on existing empirical studies of fiscal stability rules enacted in the past. The so called Fiscal Compact signed by 25 out of 27 EU member states requires the states to transpose the treaty's rules that limit the annual structural deficit and the general government debt %22through provisions of binding force and permanent character, preferably constitutional%22 (Art. 3, §2). While the goal is set, the means are up to respective states, and thus an extraordinary wave of constitutional engineering has been triggered. This paper deals with four countries in Central Europe which have already adopted fiscal stability rules into their law: Germany, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. It describes the rules adopted and demonstrates that despite some similarities, four wholly distinct models of regulation have been used in these countries. These models are further examined and compared, in particular with respect to their substance (numerical, or institutional fiscal rules), criteria used (state debt, overall public debt, state budget deficit, or structural deficit) and enforcement mechanisms created (automatic cut of expenses, vote of non-confidence in the government, veto power of an independent fiscal council, judicial review, etc.). Finally, the models are evaluated both from the perspective of their democratic legitimacy and from the perspective of their expected efficiency, where the paper draws on existing empirical studies of fiscal stability rules enacted in the past.
dcterms:title
Fiscal Stability Rules in Central European Constitutions Fiscal Stability Rules in Central European Constitutions
skos:prefLabel
Fiscal Stability Rules in Central European Constitutions Fiscal Stability Rules in Central European Constitutions
skos:notation
RIV/00216208:11220/14:10284333!RIV15-MSM-11220___
n3:aktivita
n4:I n4:P
n3:aktivity
I, P(GPP408/11/P366)
n3:dodaniDat
n7:2015
n3:domaciTvurceVysledku
n20:5215935
n3:druhVysledku
n9:C
n3:duvernostUdaju
n19:S
n3:entitaPredkladatele
n12:predkladatel
n3:idSjednocenehoVysledku
16984
n3:idVysledku
RIV/00216208:11220/14:10284333
n3:jazykVysledku
n11:eng
n3:klicovaSlova
constitutional fiscal rules; budgetary constraints; Fiscal Compact; balanced budget rule
n3:klicoveSlovo
n13:Fiscal%20Compact n13:constitutional%20fiscal%20rules n13:budgetary%20constraints n13:balanced%20budget%20rule
n3:kontrolniKodProRIV
[A66F30E6EED4]
n3:mistoVydani
Oxford
n3:nazevEdiceCisloSvazku
Neuveden
n3:nazevZdroje
The Constitutionalization of European Budgetary Constraints
n3:obor
n10:AG
n3:pocetDomacichTvurcuVysledku
1
n3:pocetStranKnihy
444
n3:pocetTvurcuVysledku
1
n3:projekt
n17:GPP408%2F11%2FP366
n3:rokUplatneniVysledku
n7:2014
n3:tvurceVysledku
Antoš, Marek
s:numberOfPages
18
n15:hasPublisher
Hart Publishing
n18:isbn
978-1-84946-580-9
n8:organizacniJednotka
11220