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Statements

Subject Item
n2:RIV%2F00216208%3A11220%2F13%3A10192750%21RIV14-MSM-11220___
rdf:type
n9:Vysledek skos:Concept
dcterms:description
Judging the influence of private law enforcement on the success of the leniency programs is a very interesting and current topic. When dealing with it, it is necessary to find an answer to following question: How should be handled the initiative of the European Commission to strengthen the private law pillar of the cartel law enforcement not to weaken the public law pillar at the same time? It is possible to assume that the support of private enforcement of damages discourages cartel participants to report the existence of a cartel and avoid the fine imposed by the state, because by admitting a cartel they potentially face an even larger financial burden than in the case of a fine. However, the other point of view is, taking into account the very low effort of the impaired parties (mainly consumers) to enforce their claims through private means, that the support of private enforcement should not be perceived as a danger to the functionality of leniency programs, but only as their suitable complement, which can exert sufficient pressure on the cartel participants to perform their activities in accordance with law. The article strives to show that at the moment the support of private enforcement of cartel law does not pose any danger to leniency programs and that the implementation of legal institutions proposed by the European Commission, which would emphasize the role of private enforcement, is desirable. Judging the influence of private law enforcement on the success of the leniency programs is a very interesting and current topic. When dealing with it, it is necessary to find an answer to following question: How should be handled the initiative of the European Commission to strengthen the private law pillar of the cartel law enforcement not to weaken the public law pillar at the same time? It is possible to assume that the support of private enforcement of damages discourages cartel participants to report the existence of a cartel and avoid the fine imposed by the state, because by admitting a cartel they potentially face an even larger financial burden than in the case of a fine. However, the other point of view is, taking into account the very low effort of the impaired parties (mainly consumers) to enforce their claims through private means, that the support of private enforcement should not be perceived as a danger to the functionality of leniency programs, but only as their suitable complement, which can exert sufficient pressure on the cartel participants to perform their activities in accordance with law. The article strives to show that at the moment the support of private enforcement of cartel law does not pose any danger to leniency programs and that the implementation of legal institutions proposed by the European Commission, which would emphasize the role of private enforcement, is desirable.
dcterms:title
Analysis of the Cartel Legislation and Leniency Programs in Germany and the Czech Republic Analysis of the Cartel Legislation and Leniency Programs in Germany and the Czech Republic
skos:prefLabel
Analysis of the Cartel Legislation and Leniency Programs in Germany and the Czech Republic Analysis of the Cartel Legislation and Leniency Programs in Germany and the Czech Republic
skos:notation
RIV/00216208:11220/13:10192750!RIV14-MSM-11220___
n9:predkladatel
n15:orjk%3A11220
n5:aktivita
n7:I
n5:aktivity
I
n5:cisloPeriodika
3
n5:dodaniDat
n14:2014
n5:domaciTvurceVysledku
n16:1987011
n5:druhVysledku
n6:J
n5:duvernostUdaju
n17:S
n5:entitaPredkladatele
n11:predkladatel
n5:idSjednocenehoVysledku
60666
n5:idVysledku
RIV/00216208:11220/13:10192750
n5:jazykVysledku
n18:eng
n5:klicovaSlova
comparative study; effectiveness; cartel law; leniency program
n5:klicoveSlovo
n8:comparative%20study n8:cartel%20law n8:effectiveness n8:leniency%20program
n5:kodStatuVydavatele
CZ - Česká republika
n5:kontrolniKodProRIV
[564A5478ED91]
n5:nazevZdroje
The Lawyer Quarterly, International Joumal for Legal Research
n5:obor
n12:AG
n5:pocetDomacichTvurcuVysledku
1
n5:pocetTvurcuVysledku
1
n5:rokUplatneniVysledku
n14:2013
n5:svazekPeriodika
3
n5:tvurceVysledku
Kocí, Miloš
s:issn
1805-840X
s:numberOfPages
17
n3:organizacniJednotka
11220