About: The unbundling regime for electricity utilities in the EU: a case of legislative and regulatory capture?

Facets (new session)
Description
Metadata
Settings
- owl:sameAs
- Inference Rule:

About: The unbundling regime for electricity utilities in the EU: a case of legislative and regulatory capture? Goto Sponge NotDistinct Permalink

An Entity of Type : http://linked.opendata.cz/ontology/domain/vavai/Vysledek, within Data Space : linked.opendata.cz associated with source document(s)

Attributes	Values
rdf:type	skos:Concept http://linked.opendata.cz/ontology/domain/vavai/Vysledek
Description	Theory and empirics suggest that by curbing competition, incumbent electricity companies which used to be and here are referred to as Vertically Integrated Utilities (VIUs), can increase their profitability through combined ownership of generation and transmission and/or distribution networks. Because curbing competition is generally believed to be welfare-reducing, EU law requires unbundling (separation) of the VIU networks. This paper shows that among the old EU member states (EU-15), countries which are perceived as more corrupt are indeed more likely to apply weaker forms of unbundling. Somewhat surprisingly, we do not obtain a similar finding for the new EU member states that acceded in 2004 (NMS-10). We provide a conjecture for this observation. Theory and empirics suggest that by curbing competition, incumbent electricity companies which used to be and here are referred to as Vertically Integrated Utilities (VIUs), can increase their profitability through combined ownership of generation and transmission and/or distribution networks. Because curbing competition is generally believed to be welfare-reducing, EU law requires unbundling (separation) of the VIU networks. This paper shows that among the old EU member states (EU-15), countries which are perceived as more corrupt are indeed more likely to apply weaker forms of unbundling. Somewhat surprisingly, we do not obtain a similar finding for the new EU member states that acceded in 2004 (NMS-10). We provide a conjecture for this observation. (en) Teorie i fakta naznačují, že kvůli omezené konkurenci mohou stávající elektrárenské společnosti – obecně označované jako vertikálně integrované firmy (VIF) – zvýšit svou ziskovost prostřednictvím kombinovaného vlastnictví produkce a transmise a/nebo distribučních sítí. Protože se všeobecně věří, že omezení konkurence redukuje blahobyt, právo EU vyžaduje neprovázanost (separaci) VIF sítí. Tato práce ukazuje, že mezi starými členskými státy EU (EU-15) je v zemích, které jsou pokládány za více zkorumpované, skutečně větší pravděpodobnost slabší formy neprovázanosti. Překvapující je, že stejné zjištění nenacházíme pro nové členské země EU (NMS-10). V tomto článku vyslovíme domněnku pro vysvětlení tohoto postřehu. (cs)
Title	The unbundling regime for electricity utilities in the EU: a case of legislative and regulatory capture? The unbundling regime for electricity utilities in the EU: a case of legislative and regulatory capture? (en) Neprovázanost elektrických sítí v EU: případ legislativního a regulatorního ovlivňování (cs)
skos:prefLabel	The unbundling regime for electricity utilities in the EU: a case of legislative and regulatory capture? The unbundling regime for electricity utilities in the EU: a case of legislative and regulatory capture? (en) Neprovázanost elektrických sítí v EU: případ legislativního a regulatorního ovlivňování (cs)
skos:notation	RIV/67985998:_____/07:00083491!RIV08-AV0-67985998
http://linked.open.../vavai/riv/strany	1;22
http://linked.open...avai/riv/aktivita	P Z
http://linked.open...avai/riv/aktivity	P(LC542), Z(AV0Z70850503)
http://linked.open...iv/cisloPeriodika	328
http://linked.open...vai/riv/dodaniDat	2008
http://linked.open...aciTvurceVysledku	Ortmann, Andreas van Koten, Silvester
http://linked.open.../riv/druhVysledku	J - Článek v odborném periodiku
http://linked.open...iv/duvernostUdaju	S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje nepodléhající ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
http://linked.open...titaPredkladatele	Národohospodářský ústav AV ČR, v. v. i.
http://linked.open...dnocenehoVysledku	456570
http://linked.open...ai/riv/idVysledku	RIV/67985998:_____/07:00083491
http://linked.open...riv/jazykVysledku	eng - angličtina
http://linked.open.../riv/klicovaSlova	electricity markets; regulation; vertical integration (en)
http://linked.open.../riv/klicoveSlovo	vertical integration regulation electricity markets
http://linked.open...odStatuVydavatele	CZ - Česká republika
http://linked.open...ontrolniKodProRIV	[2A168D54ADAA]
http://linked.open...i/riv/nazevZdroje	CERGE-EI Working Paper Series
http://linked.open...in/vavai/riv/obor	AH
http://linked.open...ichTvurcuVysledku	2 (xsd:int)
http://linked.open...cetTvurcuVysledku	2 (xsd:int)
http://linked.open...vavai/riv/projekt	Center of Advanced Political Economy Research
http://linked.open...UplatneniVysledku	2007
http://linked.open...v/svazekPeriodika	-
http://linked.open...iv/tvurceVysledku	van Koten, Silvester Ortmann, Andreas
http://linked.open...n/vavai/riv/zamer	Economic Aspects of EU and EMU Entry
issn	1211-3298
number of pages	22 (xsd:int)
is http://linked.open...avai/riv/vysledek of	The unbundling regime for electricity utilities in the EU: a case of legislative and regulatory capture? The unbundling regime for electricity utilities in the EU: a case of legislative and regulatory capture? The unbundling regime for electricity utilities in the EU: a case of legislative and regulatory capture?

Faceted Search & Find service v1.16.118 as of Jun 21 2024

Alternative Linked Data Documents: ODE Content Formats:

RDF

ODATA

Microdata

About

OpenLink Virtuoso version 07.20.3240 as of Jun 21 2024, on Linux (x86_64-pc-linux-gnu), Single-Server Edition (126 GB total memory, 114 GB memory in use)
Data on this page belongs to its respective rights holders.
Virtuoso Faceted Browser Copyright © 2009-2024 OpenLink Software