About: Lender of Last Resort and Too-Big-To-Fail Hypothesis.

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An Entity of Type : http://linked.opendata.cz/ontology/domain/vavai/Vysledek, within Data Space : linked.opendata.cz associated with source document(s)

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rdf:type	skos:Concept http://linked.opendata.cz/ontology/domain/vavai/Vysledek
Description	The persuasion of management of (mainly large) financial institutions that the government does not let them to fail (too-big-to-fail hypothesis) has been considered as one of the most serious reasons for the recent banking (resp. financial and economic) crisis. This attitude of bank management gives rise to a moral hazard as it makes banks more susceptible to risk-taking. A part of the safety net protecting banks from failure is the lender of last resort. In this paper, we focus on important arguments that are discussed in connection with the too-big-to-fail hypothesis and lender of last resort. A principal solution of TBTF problem certainly rests in smaller and thus more transparent depository institutions. The majority of small depositors do not use or need the banking services and activities of large global multifunctional financial conglomerates. They do not need complicated financial instruments in financial markets. That is the reason why corresponding restrictions on selected activities or transparent limits set for institutions licensed to accept deposits would be enough of a restrictive arrangement to obstruct the establishment of large global multifunctional financial conglomerates. The persuasion of management of (mainly large) financial institutions that the government does not let them to fail (too-big-to-fail hypothesis) has been considered as one of the most serious reasons for the recent banking (resp. financial and economic) crisis. This attitude of bank management gives rise to a moral hazard as it makes banks more susceptible to risk-taking. A part of the safety net protecting banks from failure is the lender of last resort. In this paper, we focus on important arguments that are discussed in connection with the too-big-to-fail hypothesis and lender of last resort. A principal solution of TBTF problem certainly rests in smaller and thus more transparent depository institutions. The majority of small depositors do not use or need the banking services and activities of large global multifunctional financial conglomerates. They do not need complicated financial instruments in financial markets. That is the reason why corresponding restrictions on selected activities or transparent limits set for institutions licensed to accept deposits would be enough of a restrictive arrangement to obstruct the establishment of large global multifunctional financial conglomerates. (en)
Title	Lender of Last Resort and Too-Big-To-Fail Hypothesis. Lender of Last Resort and Too-Big-To-Fail Hypothesis. (en)
skos:prefLabel	Lender of Last Resort and Too-Big-To-Fail Hypothesis. Lender of Last Resort and Too-Big-To-Fail Hypothesis. (en)
skos:notation	RIV/61989100:27510/14:86091270!RIV15-MSM-27510___
http://linked.open...avai/riv/aktivita	I
http://linked.open...avai/riv/aktivity	I
http://linked.open...vai/riv/dodaniDat	2015
http://linked.open...aciTvurceVysledku	Polouček, Stanislav
http://linked.open.../riv/druhVysledku	D - Článek ve sborníku
http://linked.open...iv/duvernostUdaju	S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje nepodléhající ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
http://linked.open...titaPredkladatele	Vysoká škola báňská - Technická univerzita Ostrava / Ekonomická fakulta
http://linked.open...dnocenehoVysledku	25971
http://linked.open...ai/riv/idVysledku	RIV/61989100:27510/14:86091270
http://linked.open...riv/jazykVysledku	eng - angličtina
http://linked.open.../riv/klicovaSlova	restructuring; financial conglomerates; moral hazard; lender of last resort; too-big-to-fail (en)
http://linked.open.../riv/klicoveSlovo	lender of last resort too-big-to-fail financial conglomerates restructuring moral hazard
http://linked.open...ontrolniKodProRIV	[2EDEABA6518D]
http://linked.open...v/mistoKonaniAkce	Ostrava
http://linked.open...i/riv/mistoVydani	Karviná
http://linked.open...i/riv/nazevZdroje	Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Finance and Banking : 16-17 October 2013, Ostrava, Czech Republic
http://linked.open...in/vavai/riv/obor	AH
http://linked.open...ichTvurcuVysledku	1 (xsd:int)
http://linked.open...cetTvurcuVysledku	1 (xsd:int)
http://linked.open...UplatneniVysledku	2014
http://linked.open...iv/tvurceVysledku	Polouček, Stanislav
http://linked.open...vavai/riv/typAkce	WRD - Světová
http://linked.open...ain/vavai/riv/wos	000345575000036
http://linked.open.../riv/zahajeniAkce	2013-10-16 (xsd:date)
number of pages	9 (xsd:int)
http://purl.org/ne...btex#hasPublisher	Silesian University, School of Business Administration
https://schema.org/isbn	978-80-7248-939-8
http://localhost/t...ganizacniJednotka	27510

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