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  • In a modification of the classical model of housing market which includes duplicate houses, economic equilibrium might not exist. As a measure of approximation the value sat (M) was proposed: the maximum number of satisfied agents in the market (M) , where an agent is said to be satisfied if, given a set of prices, he gets a most preferred house in his budget set. Clearly, market (M) admits an economic equilibrium if sat(M) is equal to the total number n of agents, but sat (M) is NP-hard to compute. In this paper we give a 2-approximation algorithm for sat (M) in the case of trichotomic preferences. On the other hand, we prove that sat (M) is hard to approximate within a factor smaller than 21/19, even if each house type is used for at most two houses. If the preferences are not required to be trichotomic, the problem is hard to approximate within a factor smaller than 1.2. We also prove that, provided the Unique Games Conjecture is true, approximation is hard within a factor 1.25 for trichotomic preferences, and within a factor 1.5 in the case of general preferences.
  • In a modification of the classical model of housing market which includes duplicate houses, economic equilibrium might not exist. As a measure of approximation the value sat (M) was proposed: the maximum number of satisfied agents in the market (M) , where an agent is said to be satisfied if, given a set of prices, he gets a most preferred house in his budget set. Clearly, market (M) admits an economic equilibrium if sat(M) is equal to the total number n of agents, but sat (M) is NP-hard to compute. In this paper we give a 2-approximation algorithm for sat (M) in the case of trichotomic preferences. On the other hand, we prove that sat (M) is hard to approximate within a factor smaller than 21/19, even if each house type is used for at most two houses. If the preferences are not required to be trichotomic, the problem is hard to approximate within a factor smaller than 1.2. We also prove that, provided the Unique Games Conjecture is true, approximation is hard within a factor 1.25 for trichotomic preferences, and within a factor 1.5 in the case of general preferences. (en)
Title
  • Approximability of Economic Equilibrium for Housing Markets with Duplicate Houses
  • Approximability of Economic Equilibrium for Housing Markets with Duplicate Houses (en)
skos:prefLabel
  • Approximability of Economic Equilibrium for Housing Markets with Duplicate Houses
  • Approximability of Economic Equilibrium for Housing Markets with Duplicate Houses (en)
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  • RIV/00216208:11320/11:10126049!RIV13-MSM-11320___
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  • Z(MSM0021620838)
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  • 186943
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  • RIV/00216208:11320/11:10126049
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  • hardness of approximation; approximation algorithms; economic equilibrium; housing markets (en)
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  • [748F7A29D253]
http://linked.open...v/mistoKonaniAkce
  • Teplá Monastery, Czech Republic
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  • Heidelberg
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  • Graph-Theoretic Concepts in Computer Science
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  • Cechlárová, Katarína
  • Jelínková, Eva
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  • 000307088100010
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issn
  • 0302-9743
number of pages
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  • 10.1007/978-3-642-25870-1_10
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  • Springer-Verlag. (Berlin; Heidelberg)
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  • 978-3-642-25869-5
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  • 11320
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