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  • Cross-culturally, participants in public goods games reward participants and punish defectors to a degree beyond that warranted by rational, profit-maximizing considerations. Costly punishment, where individuals impose costs on defectors at a cost to themselves, is thought to promote the maintenance of cooperation. However, despite substantial variation in the extent to which people punish, little is known about why some individuals, and not others, choose to pay these costs. Here, we test whether personality traits might contribute to variation in helping and punishment behavior. We first replicate a previous study using public goods scenarios to investigate effects of sex, relatedness and likelihood of future interaction on willingness to help a group member or to punish a transgressor. As in the previous study, we find that individuals are more willing to help related than unrelated needy others and that women are more likely to express desire to help than men. Desire to help was higher if the probability of future interaction is high, at least among women. In contrast, among these variables, only participant sex predicted some measures of punitive sentiment. Extending the replication, we found that punitive sentiment, but not willingness to help, was predicted by personality traits. Most notably, participants scoring lower on Agreeableness expressed more anger towards and greater desire to punish a transgressor, and were more willing to engage in costly punishment, at least in our scenario. Our results suggest that some personality traits may contribute to underpinning individual variation in social enforcement of cooperation.
  • Cross-culturally, participants in public goods games reward participants and punish defectors to a degree beyond that warranted by rational, profit-maximizing considerations. Costly punishment, where individuals impose costs on defectors at a cost to themselves, is thought to promote the maintenance of cooperation. However, despite substantial variation in the extent to which people punish, little is known about why some individuals, and not others, choose to pay these costs. Here, we test whether personality traits might contribute to variation in helping and punishment behavior. We first replicate a previous study using public goods scenarios to investigate effects of sex, relatedness and likelihood of future interaction on willingness to help a group member or to punish a transgressor. As in the previous study, we find that individuals are more willing to help related than unrelated needy others and that women are more likely to express desire to help than men. Desire to help was higher if the probability of future interaction is high, at least among women. In contrast, among these variables, only participant sex predicted some measures of punitive sentiment. Extending the replication, we found that punitive sentiment, but not willingness to help, was predicted by personality traits. Most notably, participants scoring lower on Agreeableness expressed more anger towards and greater desire to punish a transgressor, and were more willing to engage in costly punishment, at least in our scenario. Our results suggest that some personality traits may contribute to underpinning individual variation in social enforcement of cooperation. (en)
Title
  • Who Punishes? Personality Traits Predict Individual Variation in Punitive Sentiment
  • Who Punishes? Personality Traits Predict Individual Variation in Punitive Sentiment (en)
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  • Who Punishes? Personality Traits Predict Individual Variation in Punitive Sentiment
  • Who Punishes? Personality Traits Predict Individual Variation in Punitive Sentiment (en)
skos:notation
  • RIV/00216208:11310/13:10191454!RIV14-GA0-11310___
http://linked.open...avai/predkladatel
http://linked.open...avai/riv/aktivita
http://linked.open...avai/riv/aktivity
  • I, P(GAP407/10/1303)
http://linked.open...iv/cisloPeriodika
  • 1
http://linked.open...vai/riv/dodaniDat
http://linked.open...aciTvurceVysledku
http://linked.open.../riv/druhVysledku
http://linked.open...iv/duvernostUdaju
http://linked.open...titaPredkladatele
http://linked.open...dnocenehoVysledku
  • 117336
http://linked.open...ai/riv/idVysledku
  • RIV/00216208:11310/13:10191454
http://linked.open...riv/jazykVysledku
http://linked.open.../riv/klicovaSlova
  • evolutionary economics; ultimatum game; prisoner's dilemma; altruistic punishment; reciprocity (en)
http://linked.open.../riv/klicoveSlovo
http://linked.open...odStatuVydavatele
  • US - Spojené státy americké
http://linked.open...ontrolniKodProRIV
  • [72E6C1198BAD]
http://linked.open...i/riv/nazevZdroje
  • Evolutionary Psychology
http://linked.open...in/vavai/riv/obor
http://linked.open...ichTvurcuVysledku
http://linked.open...cetTvurcuVysledku
http://linked.open...vavai/riv/projekt
http://linked.open...UplatneniVysledku
http://linked.open...v/svazekPeriodika
  • 11
http://linked.open...iv/tvurceVysledku
  • Havlíček, Jan
  • Roberts, S. Craig
  • Kristjansdottir, Lilja
  • Vakirtzis, Antonios
http://linked.open...ain/vavai/riv/wos
  • 000317897300016
issn
  • 1474-7049
number of pages
http://localhost/t...ganizacniJednotka
  • 11310
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