The objective of the project is extension of analysis of voting behavior and models from the standpoint of possible strategic voting (sometimes associated with manipulation). By strategic voting we mean voters' behavior promising maximization of expected individual or group utilities. By manipulation we mean such strategic behavior of one group that wants to influence some other voters to vote against their interests but for interests of manipulating group. As an innovation to existing approaches we want to introduce into the voting models categories of non-rational, semi-rational and rational voters and to study also information complexity of strategic voting. Game-theoretical and other operations research approaches (multi-criteria optimization) will be employed as a general framework of the models. There are two types of research output anticipated: theoretical models as contribution to rational voters' theory, and empirical study of the new electoral history of the Czech Republic (1993-2010) and voting rules in European Union with an emphasis on elements of strategic voting. (en)
Rozvoj modelů volebního chování z hlediska tzv. strategického hlasování a manipulace. Inovace existujících modelů zavedením kategorií neracionálních, částečně racionálních a racionálních voličů a informační složitosti strategického hlasování. Empirické analýzy voleb v ČR a pravidel rozhodování v EU.