About: Corruption, Rule of Law, and Economic Efficiency: Selected Anecdotic Evidence of Bureaucratic Corruption from the Czech and Slovak Republics

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About: Corruption, Rule of Law, and Economic Efficiency: Selected Anecdotic Evidence of Bureaucratic Corruption from the Czech and Slovak Republics Goto Sponge NotDistinct Permalink

An Entity of Type : http://linked.opendata.cz/ontology/domain/vavai/Vysledek, within Data Space : linked.opendata.cz associated with source document(s)

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rdf:type	skos:Concept http://linked.opendata.cz/ontology/domain/vavai/Vysledek
Description	Can corruption improve economic efficiency? Scholars making economic policy recommendations to resolve corruption problem use several approaches, the most dominant of which are the principal-agent and rent-seeking theories. In this paper, we argue that the principal-agent theory has problems accounting for the environment in which the agents offering and accepting corruption operate, as well as explaining the importance of the agents for the survival of their environment. The rent-seeking theory, on the other hand, finds it difficult to establish socially effective legislation and ways to determine the barriers to entry that motivate agents to behave corruptly. For these reasons we present alternative model of the theory of redistribution systems and its part parallel redistribution games to synthesize both agency theory and rent-seeking and investigate if both problems can be explained and solved. Within our model we present selected quasi-experimental anecdotic evidence from the early period of transition in the Czech and Slovak Republics to support the implication that the corruption undermines economic efficiency. Can corruption improve economic efficiency? Scholars making economic policy recommendations to resolve corruption problem use several approaches, the most dominant of which are the principal-agent and rent-seeking theories. In this paper, we argue that the principal-agent theory has problems accounting for the environment in which the agents offering and accepting corruption operate, as well as explaining the importance of the agents for the survival of their environment. The rent-seeking theory, on the other hand, finds it difficult to establish socially effective legislation and ways to determine the barriers to entry that motivate agents to behave corruptly. For these reasons we present alternative model of the theory of redistribution systems and its part parallel redistribution games to synthesize both agency theory and rent-seeking and investigate if both problems can be explained and solved. Within our model we present selected quasi-experimental anecdotic evidence from the early period of transition in the Czech and Slovak Republics to support the implication that the corruption undermines economic efficiency. (en)
Title	Corruption, Rule of Law, and Economic Efficiency: Selected Anecdotic Evidence of Bureaucratic Corruption from the Czech and Slovak Republics Corruption, Rule of Law, and Economic Efficiency: Selected Anecdotic Evidence of Bureaucratic Corruption from the Czech and Slovak Republics (en)
skos:prefLabel	Corruption, Rule of Law, and Economic Efficiency: Selected Anecdotic Evidence of Bureaucratic Corruption from the Czech and Slovak Republics Corruption, Rule of Law, and Economic Efficiency: Selected Anecdotic Evidence of Bureaucratic Corruption from the Czech and Slovak Republics (en)
skos:notation	RIV/62156489:43110/12:00191106!RIV13-MSM-43110___
http://linked.open...avai/riv/aktivita	Z
http://linked.open...avai/riv/aktivity	Z(MSM6215648904)
http://linked.open...vai/riv/dodaniDat	2013
http://linked.open...aciTvurceVysledku	Otáhal, Tomáš
http://linked.open.../riv/druhVysledku	D - Článek ve sborníku
http://linked.open...iv/duvernostUdaju	S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje nepodléhající ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
http://linked.open...titaPredkladatele	Mendelova univerzita v Brně / Provozně ekonomická fakulta
http://linked.open...dnocenehoVysledku	128881
http://linked.open...ai/riv/idVysledku	RIV/62156489:43110/12:00191106
http://linked.open...riv/jazykVysledku	eng - angličtina
http://linked.open.../riv/klicovaSlova	Anecdotic evidence, bureaucracy,; rent-seeking, redistribution system, rule of law, parallel redistribution game; corruption, economic efficiency, (en)
http://linked.open.../riv/klicoveSlovo	bureaucracy corruption economic efficiency rent-seeking rule of law Anecdotic evidence parallel redistribution game redistribution system
http://linked.open...ontrolniKodProRIV	[7DA8E9924111]
http://linked.open...v/mistoKonaniAkce	Prague
http://linked.open...i/riv/mistoVydani	Prague
http://linked.open...i/riv/nazevZdroje	Human Capital and Financial Management: Proceedings of The XV. International Scientific Conference
http://linked.open...in/vavai/riv/obor	AH
http://linked.open...ichTvurcuVysledku	1 (xsd:int)
http://linked.open...cetTvurcuVysledku	2 (xsd:int)
http://linked.open...UplatneniVysledku	2012
http://linked.open...iv/tvurceVysledku	Otáhal, Tomáš Wawrosz, Petr
http://linked.open...vavai/riv/typAkce	EUR - Evropská
http://linked.open.../riv/zahajeniAkce	2012-09-24 (xsd:date)
http://linked.open...n/vavai/riv/zamer	The Czech Economy in the Process of Integration and Globalisation, and the Development of Agricultural Sector and the Sector of Services under the New Conditions of the Integrated European Market
number of pages	15 (xsd:int)
http://purl.org/ne...btex#hasPublisher	University of Finance and Administration
https://schema.org/isbn	978-80-7408-071-5
http://localhost/t...ganizacniJednotka	43110

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