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  • Judging the influence of private law enforcement on the success of the leniency programs is a very interesting and current topic. When dealing with it, it is necessary to find an answer to following question: How should be handled the initiative of the European Commission to strengthen the private law pillar of the cartel law enforcement not to weaken the public law pillar at the same time? It is possible to assume that the support of private enforcement of damages discourages cartel participants to report the existence of a cartel and avoid the fine imposed by the state, because by admitting a cartel they potentially face an even larger financial burden than in the case of a fine. However, the other point of view is, taking into account the very low effort of the impaired parties (mainly consumers) to enforce their claims through private means, that the support of private enforcement should not be perceived as a danger to the functionality of leniency programs, but only as their suitable complement, which can exert sufficient pressure on the cartel participants to perform their activities in accordance with law. The article strives to show that at the moment the support of private enforcement of cartel law does not pose any danger to leniency programs and that the implementation of legal institutions proposed by the European Commission, which would emphasize the role of private enforcement, is desirable.
  • Judging the influence of private law enforcement on the success of the leniency programs is a very interesting and current topic. When dealing with it, it is necessary to find an answer to following question: How should be handled the initiative of the European Commission to strengthen the private law pillar of the cartel law enforcement not to weaken the public law pillar at the same time? It is possible to assume that the support of private enforcement of damages discourages cartel participants to report the existence of a cartel and avoid the fine imposed by the state, because by admitting a cartel they potentially face an even larger financial burden than in the case of a fine. However, the other point of view is, taking into account the very low effort of the impaired parties (mainly consumers) to enforce their claims through private means, that the support of private enforcement should not be perceived as a danger to the functionality of leniency programs, but only as their suitable complement, which can exert sufficient pressure on the cartel participants to perform their activities in accordance with law. The article strives to show that at the moment the support of private enforcement of cartel law does not pose any danger to leniency programs and that the implementation of legal institutions proposed by the European Commission, which would emphasize the role of private enforcement, is desirable. (en)
Title
  • Analysis of the Cartel Legislation and Leniency Programs in Germany and the Czech Republic
  • Analysis of the Cartel Legislation and Leniency Programs in Germany and the Czech Republic (en)
skos:prefLabel
  • Analysis of the Cartel Legislation and Leniency Programs in Germany and the Czech Republic
  • Analysis of the Cartel Legislation and Leniency Programs in Germany and the Czech Republic (en)
skos:notation
  • RIV/00216208:11220/13:10192750!RIV14-MSM-11220___
http://linked.open...avai/riv/aktivita
http://linked.open...avai/riv/aktivity
  • I
http://linked.open...iv/cisloPeriodika
  • 3
http://linked.open...vai/riv/dodaniDat
http://linked.open...aciTvurceVysledku
http://linked.open.../riv/druhVysledku
http://linked.open...iv/duvernostUdaju
http://linked.open...titaPredkladatele
http://linked.open...dnocenehoVysledku
  • 60666
http://linked.open...ai/riv/idVysledku
  • RIV/00216208:11220/13:10192750
http://linked.open...riv/jazykVysledku
http://linked.open.../riv/klicovaSlova
  • comparative study; effectiveness; cartel law; leniency program (en)
http://linked.open.../riv/klicoveSlovo
http://linked.open...odStatuVydavatele
  • CZ - Česká republika
http://linked.open...ontrolniKodProRIV
  • [564A5478ED91]
http://linked.open...i/riv/nazevZdroje
  • The Lawyer Quarterly, International Joumal for Legal Research
http://linked.open...in/vavai/riv/obor
http://linked.open...ichTvurcuVysledku
http://linked.open...cetTvurcuVysledku
http://linked.open...UplatneniVysledku
http://linked.open...v/svazekPeriodika
  • 3
http://linked.open...iv/tvurceVysledku
  • Kocí, Miloš
issn
  • 1805-840X
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http://localhost/t...ganizacniJednotka
  • 11220
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