About: Central Bank Independence and Budget Deficits: Coincidence or Causality?     Goto   Sponge   Distinct   Permalink

An Entity of Type : http://linked.opendata.cz/ontology/domain/vavai/Vysledek, within Data Space : linked.opendata.cz associated with source document(s)

AttributesValues
rdf:type
Description
  • In the context of economic crisis re-appears the question of fiscal and monetary policy interaction and implications of this relationship. Many central banks participated on the economic policy which has pure fiscal dimension in the last years. The aim of the article is to evaluate relationship between central bank independence and budget deficit of the OECD member countries in the period 1990–2011. For the evaluation of the chosen relationship will be used indexes of central bank independence de jure, de facto and primary budget deficits. Those indexes will be constructed according relevant legislation, mainly according central bank laws. For the relationship investigation will be used regression analysis of panel data. The aim of paper is to evaluate impact of central bank independence on the primary budget deficits in the case of OECD member countries in 1990-2012 according methodology of Lucotte (2009). The results of empirical part of the paper concludes that more independent central bank can positively influence budget deficits and that higher central bank independence can contribute to grater fiscal discipline of policymakers. In the case that central bank has only one main aim this fact supports lower possibility of misusing monetary policy for short-term monetary aims. More disciplined fiscal policy can finally help to avoid another budget crisis which are current problem of many developed economies.
  • In the context of economic crisis re-appears the question of fiscal and monetary policy interaction and implications of this relationship. Many central banks participated on the economic policy which has pure fiscal dimension in the last years. The aim of the article is to evaluate relationship between central bank independence and budget deficit of the OECD member countries in the period 1990–2011. For the evaluation of the chosen relationship will be used indexes of central bank independence de jure, de facto and primary budget deficits. Those indexes will be constructed according relevant legislation, mainly according central bank laws. For the relationship investigation will be used regression analysis of panel data. The aim of paper is to evaluate impact of central bank independence on the primary budget deficits in the case of OECD member countries in 1990-2012 according methodology of Lucotte (2009). The results of empirical part of the paper concludes that more independent central bank can positively influence budget deficits and that higher central bank independence can contribute to grater fiscal discipline of policymakers. In the case that central bank has only one main aim this fact supports lower possibility of misusing monetary policy for short-term monetary aims. More disciplined fiscal policy can finally help to avoid another budget crisis which are current problem of many developed economies. (en)
Title
  • Central Bank Independence and Budget Deficits: Coincidence or Causality?
  • Central Bank Independence and Budget Deficits: Coincidence or Causality? (en)
skos:prefLabel
  • Central Bank Independence and Budget Deficits: Coincidence or Causality?
  • Central Bank Independence and Budget Deficits: Coincidence or Causality? (en)
skos:notation
  • RIV/61989100:27510/13:86086837!RIV14-MSM-27510___
http://linked.open...avai/predkladatel
http://linked.open...avai/riv/aktivita
http://linked.open...avai/riv/aktivity
  • P(EE2.3.20.0296)
http://linked.open...vai/riv/dodaniDat
http://linked.open...aciTvurceVysledku
http://linked.open.../riv/druhVysledku
http://linked.open...iv/duvernostUdaju
http://linked.open...titaPredkladatele
http://linked.open...dnocenehoVysledku
  • 64551
http://linked.open...ai/riv/idVysledku
  • RIV/61989100:27510/13:86086837
http://linked.open...riv/jazykVysledku
http://linked.open.../riv/klicovaSlova
  • central bank independence de jure, central bank independence de facto, budget deficits, panel data (en)
http://linked.open.../riv/klicoveSlovo
http://linked.open...ontrolniKodProRIV
  • [C11581DED63B]
http://linked.open...v/mistoKonaniAkce
  • Ostrava
http://linked.open...i/riv/mistoVydani
  • Ostrava
http://linked.open...i/riv/nazevZdroje
  • Proceedings of the 11th International Conference Economic Policy in the European Union Member Countries : [18.-20. September 2013, Ostrava]
http://linked.open...in/vavai/riv/obor
http://linked.open...ichTvurcuVysledku
http://linked.open...cetTvurcuVysledku
http://linked.open...vavai/riv/projekt
http://linked.open...UplatneniVysledku
http://linked.open...iv/tvurceVysledku
  • Janíčková, Lenka
  • Baranová, Veronika
http://linked.open...vavai/riv/typAkce
http://linked.open.../riv/zahajeniAkce
number of pages
http://purl.org/ne...btex#hasPublisher
  • Vysoká škola báňská - Technická univerzita Ostrava
https://schema.org/isbn
  • 978-80-248-3095-7
http://localhost/t...ganizacniJednotka
  • 27510
Faceted Search & Find service v1.16.118 as of Jun 21 2024


Alternative Linked Data Documents: ODE     Content Formats:   [cxml] [csv]     RDF   [text] [turtle] [ld+json] [rdf+json] [rdf+xml]     ODATA   [atom+xml] [odata+json]     Microdata   [microdata+json] [html]    About   
This material is Open Knowledge   W3C Semantic Web Technology [RDF Data] Valid XHTML + RDFa
OpenLink Virtuoso version 07.20.3240 as of Jun 21 2024, on Linux (x86_64-pc-linux-gnu), Single-Server Edition (126 GB total memory, 58 GB memory in use)
Data on this page belongs to its respective rights holders.
Virtuoso Faceted Browser Copyright © 2009-2024 OpenLink Software